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When user middle clicks a link, most users must not expect to expose clipboard content to the web application. Therefore, we should stop firing paste event when user click a link with middle button. This patch makes ClickHandlerChild.handleEvent() prevent multiple action when it posts middle click event on a link. Note that even if middle click event is consumed, default event handler will dispatch paste event. Unfortunately, this is compatible behavior with the other browsers. Therefore, we cannot change this behavior with calling preventDefault() and this is the reason why this patch adds Event.preventMultipleActions(). Out of scope of this bug though, if there is an element which looks like a link but implemented with JS, web apps can steal clipboard content if user enables middle click event and user just wants to open the link in new tab. It might be better to stop dispatching paste event in any browsers and request to change each web apps. Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D17209 --HG-- extra : moz-landing-system : lando
162 lines
6.1 KiB
JavaScript
162 lines
6.1 KiB
JavaScript
/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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var EXPORTED_SYMBOLS = ["ClickHandlerChild"];
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const {ActorChild} = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/ActorChild.jsm");
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const {Services} = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm");
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ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(this, "BrowserUtils",
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"resource://gre/modules/BrowserUtils.jsm");
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ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(this, "PrivateBrowsingUtils",
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"resource://gre/modules/PrivateBrowsingUtils.jsm");
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ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(this, "WebNavigationFrames",
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"resource://gre/modules/WebNavigationFrames.jsm");
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class ClickHandlerChild extends ActorChild {
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handleEvent(event) {
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if (!event.isTrusted || event.defaultPrevented || event.button == 2) {
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return;
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}
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let originalTarget = event.originalTarget;
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let ownerDoc = originalTarget.ownerDocument;
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if (!ownerDoc) {
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return;
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}
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// Handle click events from about pages
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if (event.button == 0) {
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if (ownerDoc.documentURI.startsWith("about:blocked")) {
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return;
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}
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}
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let [href, node, principal] = this._hrefAndLinkNodeForClickEvent(event);
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// get referrer attribute from clicked link and parse it
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// if per element referrer is enabled, the element referrer overrules
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// the document wide referrer
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let referrerPolicy = ownerDoc.referrerPolicy;
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if (node) {
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let referrerAttrValue = Services.netUtils.parseAttributePolicyString(node.
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getAttribute("referrerpolicy"));
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if (referrerAttrValue !== Ci.nsIHttpChannel.REFERRER_POLICY_UNSET) {
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referrerPolicy = referrerAttrValue;
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}
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}
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let frameOuterWindowID = WebNavigationFrames.getFrameId(ownerDoc.defaultView);
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let json = { button: event.button, shiftKey: event.shiftKey,
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ctrlKey: event.ctrlKey, metaKey: event.metaKey,
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altKey: event.altKey, href: null, title: null,
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frameOuterWindowID, referrerPolicy,
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triggeringPrincipal: principal,
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originAttributes: principal ? principal.originAttributes : {},
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isContentWindowPrivate: PrivateBrowsingUtils.isContentWindowPrivate(ownerDoc.defaultView)};
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if (href) {
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try {
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BrowserUtils.urlSecurityCheck(href, principal);
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} catch (e) {
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return;
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}
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json.href = href;
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if (node) {
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json.title = node.getAttribute("title");
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}
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json.noReferrer = BrowserUtils.linkHasNoReferrer(node);
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// Check if the link needs to be opened with mixed content allowed.
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// Only when the owner doc has |mixedContentChannel| and the same origin
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// should we allow mixed content.
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json.allowMixedContent = false;
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let docshell = ownerDoc.defaultView.docShell;
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if (this.mm.docShell.mixedContentChannel) {
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const sm = Services.scriptSecurityManager;
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try {
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let targetURI = Services.io.newURI(href);
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let isPrivateWin = ownerDoc.nodePrincipal.originAttributes.privateBrowsingId > 0;
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sm.checkSameOriginURI(docshell.mixedContentChannel.URI, targetURI, false, isPrivateWin);
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json.allowMixedContent = true;
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} catch (e) {}
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}
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json.originPrincipal = ownerDoc.nodePrincipal;
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json.triggeringPrincipal = ownerDoc.nodePrincipal;
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// If a link element is clicked with middle button, user wants to open
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// the link somewhere rather than pasting clipboard content. Therefore,
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// when it's clicked with middle button, we should prevent multiple
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// actions here to avoid leaking clipboard content unexpectedly.
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// Note that whether the link will work actually or not does not matter
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// because in this case, user does not intent to paste clipboard content.
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if (event.button === 1) {
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event.preventMultipleActions();
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}
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this.mm.sendAsyncMessage("Content:Click", json);
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return;
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}
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// This might be middle mouse navigation.
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if (event.button == 1) {
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this.mm.sendAsyncMessage("Content:Click", json);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Extracts linkNode and href for the current click target.
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*
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* @param event
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* The click event.
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* @return [href, linkNode, linkPrincipal].
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*
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* @note linkNode will be null if the click wasn't on an anchor
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* element. This includes SVG links, because callers expect |node|
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* to behave like an <a> element, which SVG links (XLink) don't.
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*/
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_hrefAndLinkNodeForClickEvent(event) {
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let {content} = this.mm;
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function isHTMLLink(aNode) {
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// Be consistent with what nsContextMenu.js does.
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return ((aNode instanceof content.HTMLAnchorElement && aNode.href) ||
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(aNode instanceof content.HTMLAreaElement && aNode.href) ||
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aNode instanceof content.HTMLLinkElement);
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}
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let node = event.composedTarget;
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while (node && !isHTMLLink(node)) {
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node = node.flattenedTreeParentNode;
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}
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if (node)
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return [node.href, node, node.ownerDocument.nodePrincipal];
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// If there is no linkNode, try simple XLink.
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let href, baseURI;
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node = event.composedTarget;
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while (node && !href) {
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if (node.nodeType == content.Node.ELEMENT_NODE &&
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(node.localName == "a" ||
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node.namespaceURI == "http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML")) {
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href = node.getAttribute("href") ||
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node.getAttributeNS("http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink", "href");
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if (href) {
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baseURI = node.ownerDocument.baseURIObject;
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break;
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}
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}
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node = node.flattenedTreeParentNode;
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}
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// In case of XLink, we don't return the node we got href from since
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// callers expect <a>-like elements.
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// Note: makeURI() will throw if aUri is not a valid URI.
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return [href ? Services.io.newURI(href, null, baseURI).spec : null, null,
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node && node.ownerDocument.nodePrincipal];
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}
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}
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