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	random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
This gives the user building their own kernel (or a Linux distribution) the option of deciding whether or not to trust the CPU's hardware random number generator (e.g., RDRAND for x86 CPU's) as being correctly implemented and not having a back door introduced (perhaps courtesy of a Nation State's law enforcement or intelligence agencies). This will prevent getrandom(2) from blocking, if there is a willingness to trust the CPU manufacturer. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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					 2 changed files with 24 additions and 1 deletions
				
			
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					@ -554,3 +554,17 @@ config ADI
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endmenu
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					endmenu
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					config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
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						bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
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						depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
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						default n
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						help
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						Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
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						RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
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						for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG.  Since this is not
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						something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
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						that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
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						of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
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						has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
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						random number generation facilities.
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					@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
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static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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					static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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{
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					{
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	int		i;
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						int		i;
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						int		arch_init = 1;
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	unsigned long	rv;
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						unsigned long	rv;
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	memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
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						memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
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					@ -792,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
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		_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
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							_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
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	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
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						for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
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		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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							if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
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		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
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							    !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
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			rv = random_get_entropy();
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								rv = random_get_entropy();
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								arch_init = 0;
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							}
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		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
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							crng->state[i] ^= rv;
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	}
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						}
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					#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
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						if (arch_init) {
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							crng_init = 2;
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							pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
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						}
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					#endif
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	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
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						crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
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}
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					}
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