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	readv/writev: do the same MAX_RW_COUNT truncation that read/write does
We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT. This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't break. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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					 3 changed files with 40 additions and 35 deletions
				
			
		
							
								
								
									
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								fs/compat.c
									
									
									
									
									
								
							
							
						
						
									
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								fs/compat.c
									
									
									
									
									
								
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			@ -606,14 +606,14 @@ ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
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	/*
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	 * Single unix specification:
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	 * We should -EINVAL if an element length is not >= 0 and fitting an
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	 * ssize_t.  The total length is fitting an ssize_t
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	 * ssize_t.
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	 *
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	 * Be careful here because iov_len is a size_t not an ssize_t
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	 * In Linux, the total length is limited to MAX_RW_COUNT, there is
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	 * no overflow possibility.
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	 */
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	tot_len = 0;
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	ret = -EINVAL;
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	for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
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		compat_ssize_t tmp = tot_len;
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		compat_uptr_t buf;
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		compat_ssize_t len;
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			@ -624,13 +624,13 @@ ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
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		}
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		if (len < 0)	/* size_t not fitting in compat_ssize_t .. */
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			goto out;
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		tot_len += len;
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		if (tot_len < tmp) /* maths overflow on the compat_ssize_t */
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			goto out;
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		if (!access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), compat_ptr(buf), len)) {
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			ret = -EFAULT;
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			goto out;
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		}
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		if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT - tot_len)
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			len = MAX_RW_COUNT - tot_len;
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		tot_len += len;
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		iov->iov_base = compat_ptr(buf);
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		iov->iov_len = (compat_size_t) len;
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		uvector++;
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			@ -243,8 +243,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(llseek, unsigned int, fd, unsigned long, offset_high,
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 * them to something that fits in "int" so that others
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 * won't have to do range checks all the time.
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 */
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#define MAX_RW_COUNT (INT_MAX & PAGE_CACHE_MASK)
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int rw_verify_area(int read_write, struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, size_t count)
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{
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	struct inode *inode;
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			@ -584,65 +582,71 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
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			      unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned long fast_segs,
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			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
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			      struct iovec **ret_pointer)
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  {
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{
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	unsigned long seg;
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  	ssize_t ret;
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	ssize_t ret;
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	struct iovec *iov = fast_pointer;
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  	/*
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  	 * SuS says "The readv() function *may* fail if the iovcnt argument
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  	 * was less than or equal to 0, or greater than {IOV_MAX}.  Linux has
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  	 * traditionally returned zero for zero segments, so...
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  	 */
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	/*
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	 * SuS says "The readv() function *may* fail if the iovcnt argument
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	 * was less than or equal to 0, or greater than {IOV_MAX}.  Linux has
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	 * traditionally returned zero for zero segments, so...
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	 */
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	if (nr_segs == 0) {
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		ret = 0;
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  		goto out;
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		goto out;
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	}
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  	/*
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  	 * First get the "struct iovec" from user memory and
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  	 * verify all the pointers
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  	 */
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	/*
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	 * First get the "struct iovec" from user memory and
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	 * verify all the pointers
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	 */
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	if (nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV) {
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		ret = -EINVAL;
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  		goto out;
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		goto out;
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	}
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	if (nr_segs > fast_segs) {
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  		iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL);
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		iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL);
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		if (iov == NULL) {
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			ret = -ENOMEM;
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  			goto out;
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			goto out;
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		}
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  	}
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	}
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	if (copy_from_user(iov, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector))) {
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		ret = -EFAULT;
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  		goto out;
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		goto out;
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	}
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  	/*
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	/*
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	 * According to the Single Unix Specification we should return EINVAL
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	 * if an element length is < 0 when cast to ssize_t or if the
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	 * total length would overflow the ssize_t return value of the
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	 * system call.
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  	 */
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	 *
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	 * Linux caps all read/write calls to MAX_RW_COUNT, and avoids the
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	 * overflow case.
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	 */
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	ret = 0;
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  	for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
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  		void __user *buf = iov[seg].iov_base;
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  		ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len;
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	for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
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		void __user *buf = iov[seg].iov_base;
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		ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len;
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		/* see if we we're about to use an invalid len or if
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		 * it's about to overflow ssize_t */
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		if (len < 0 || (ret + len < ret)) {
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		if (len < 0) {
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			ret = -EINVAL;
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  			goto out;
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			goto out;
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		}
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		if (unlikely(!access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), buf, len))) {
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			ret = -EFAULT;
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  			goto out;
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			goto out;
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		}
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		if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT - ret) {
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			len = MAX_RW_COUNT - ret;
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			iov[seg].iov_len = len;
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		}
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		ret += len;
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  	}
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	}
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out:
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	*ret_pointer = iov;
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	return ret;
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			@ -1867,6 +1867,7 @@ extern int current_umask(void);
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/* /sys/fs */
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extern struct kobject *fs_kobj;
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#define MAX_RW_COUNT (INT_MAX & PAGE_CACHE_MASK)
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extern int rw_verify_area(int, struct file *, loff_t *, size_t);
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#define FLOCK_VERIFY_READ  1
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