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x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation

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Restructure spectre_v2 to use select/update/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.

The spectre_v2 mitigation may be updated based on the selected retbleed
mitigation.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250418161721.1855190-14-david.kaplan@amd.com
This commit is contained in:
David Kaplan 2025-04-18 11:17:18 -05:00 committed by Borislav Petkov (AMD)
parent efe313827c
commit 480e803dac
1 changed files with 72 additions and 61 deletions
repo.diff.show_diff_stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

131
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View file

@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);
@ -217,6 +219,12 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
* After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
* choices.
*/
spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
/*
* retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
* spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
* spectre_v2=ibrs.
*/
retbleed_update_mitigation();
/*
@ -232,6 +240,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
bhi_update_mitigation();
spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
retbleed_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
@ -1878,75 +1887,80 @@ static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void)
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
spectre_v2_cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
/*
* If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
* then nothing to do.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
(cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
(spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
return;
switch (cmd) {
switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
}
spectre_v2_enabled = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
spectre_v2_enabled = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
break;
}
}
static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE &&
retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
break;
spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
}
}
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
break;
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) && !cpu_mitigations_off())
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
}
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
} else {
@ -1955,8 +1969,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
switch (mode) {
switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
break;
@ -1982,15 +1998,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
* JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
* prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
*/
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(mode);
spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(spectre_v2_enabled);
/*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
@ -1998,10 +2011,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
* otherwise enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
* Use "spectre_v2_enabled" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of
* boot_cpu_has(), because the user might select retpoline on the kernel
* command line and if the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might
* un-intentionally not enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
@ -2013,13 +2026,11 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("Enabling Speculation Barrier for firmware calls\n");
}
} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
} else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
!spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
}
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)