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	x86/mce: relocate set{clear}_mce_nospec() functions
Relocate the twin mce functions to arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
file where they belong.
While at it, fixup a function name in a comment.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
[sfr: gate {set,clear}_mce_nospec() by CONFIG_X86_64]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165272527328.90175.8336008202048685278.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
			
			
This commit is contained in:
		
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					 3 changed files with 52 additions and 58 deletions
				
			
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			@ -86,56 +86,4 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
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extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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/*
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 * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
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 * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
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 * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
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 * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
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 */
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static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
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{
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	unsigned long decoy_addr;
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	int rc;
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	/* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */
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	if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
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		return 0;
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	/*
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	 * We would like to just call:
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	 *      set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
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	 * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
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	 * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
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	 * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
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	 * around in registers.
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	 * Instead we get tricky.  We create a non-canonical address
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	 * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
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	 * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
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	 * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
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	 */
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	decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
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	if (unmap)
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		rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
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	else
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		rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
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	if (rc)
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		pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
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	return rc;
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}
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#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec
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/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
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static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
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{
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	return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
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}
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#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec
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#else
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/*
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 * Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
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 * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
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 */
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#endif
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */
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			@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
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#include <linux/vmstat.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
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#include <linux/set_memory.h>
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#include <asm/e820/api.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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			@ -29,7 +30,6 @@
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#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
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#include <asm/proto.h>
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#include <asm/memtype.h>
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#include <asm/set_memory.h>
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#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
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#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
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			@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ static inline int cpa_clear_pages_array(struct page **pages, int numpages,
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}
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/*
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 * _set_memory_prot is an internal helper for callers that have been passed
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 * __set_memory_prot is an internal helper for callers that have been passed
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 * a pgprot_t value from upper layers and a reservation has already been taken.
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 * If you want to set the pgprot to a specific page protocol, use the
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 * set_memory_xx() functions.
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			@ -1925,6 +1925,52 @@ int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_memory_wb);
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/*
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 * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
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 * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
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 * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
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 * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
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 */
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
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{
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	unsigned long decoy_addr;
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	int rc;
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	/* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */
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	if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
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		return 0;
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	/*
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	 * We would like to just call:
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	 *      set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
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	 * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
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	 * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
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	 * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
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	 * around in registers.
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	 * Instead we get tricky.  We create a non-canonical address
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	 * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
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	 * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
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	 * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
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	 */
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	decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
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	if (unmap)
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		rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
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	else
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		rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
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	if (rc)
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		pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
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	return rc;
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}
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/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
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int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
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{
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	return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_mce_nospec);
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#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
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int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
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{
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	if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
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			@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void)
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#endif
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#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
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#ifndef set_mce_nospec
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap);
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int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn);
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#else
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static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
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{
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	return 0;
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}
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#endif
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#ifndef clear_mce_nospec
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static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
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{
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	return 0;
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