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	proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener
Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
			
			
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					@ -2703,6 +2703,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
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	void *page;
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						void *page;
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	int rv;
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						int rv;
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						/* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
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						if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
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							return -EPERM;
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	rcu_read_lock();
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						rcu_read_lock();
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	task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
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						task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
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	if (!task) {
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						if (!task) {
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