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	bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted
Martin mentioned that the verifier cannot assume arguments from
LSM hook sk_alloc_security being trusted since after the hook
is called, the sk ref_count is set to 1. This will overwrite
the ref_count changed by the bpf program and may cause ref_count
underflow later on.
I then further checked some other hooks. For example,
for bpf_lsm_file_alloc() hook in fs/file_table.c,
        f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
        error = security_file_alloc(f);
        if (unlikely(error)) {
                file_free_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead);
                return ERR_PTR(error);
        }
        atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
The input parameter 'f' to security_file_alloc() cannot be trusted
as well.
Specifically, I investiaged bpf_map/bpf_prog/file/sk/task alloc/free
lsm hooks. Except bpf_map_alloc and task_alloc, arguments for all other
hooks should not be considered as trusted. This may not be a complete
list, but it covers common usage for sk and task.
Fixes: 3f00c52393 ("bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203204954.2043348-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
			
			
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					 5 changed files with 36 additions and 0 deletions
				
			
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					@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
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			const struct bpf_prog *prog);
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								const struct bpf_prog *prog);
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bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
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					bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
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					bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
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static inline struct bpf_storage_blob *bpf_inode(
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					static inline struct bpf_storage_blob *bpf_inode(
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	const struct inode *inode)
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						const struct inode *inode)
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					@ -51,6 +52,11 @@ static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
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	return false;
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						return false;
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}
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					}
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					static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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					{
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						return false;
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					}
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static inline int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
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					static inline int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
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				      const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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									      const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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{
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					{
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					@ -345,11 +345,27 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
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BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_userns_create)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_userns_create)
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BTF_SET_END(sleepable_lsm_hooks)
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					BTF_SET_END(sleepable_lsm_hooks)
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					BTF_SET_START(untrusted_lsm_hooks)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_alloc_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security)
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					BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_free)
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					BTF_SET_END(untrusted_lsm_hooks)
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bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
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					bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
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{
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					{
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	return btf_id_set_contains(&sleepable_lsm_hooks, btf_id);
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						return btf_id_set_contains(&sleepable_lsm_hooks, btf_id);
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}
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					}
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					bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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					{
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						return !btf_id_set_contains(&untrusted_lsm_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id);
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					}
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const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = {
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					const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = {
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};
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					};
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					@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
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#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
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					#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
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#include <linux/btf.h>
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					#include <linux/btf.h>
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#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
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					#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
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					#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
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#include <linux/skmsg.h>
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					#include <linux/skmsg.h>
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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					#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/bsearch.h>
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					#include <linux/bsearch.h>
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					@ -5829,6 +5830,7 @@ static bool prog_args_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
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						case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
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		return atype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP || atype == BPF_TRACE_ITER;
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							return atype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP || atype == BPF_TRACE_ITER;
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	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
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						case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
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							return bpf_lsm_is_trusted(prog);
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	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
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						case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
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		return true;
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							return true;
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	default:
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						default:
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					@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ static struct {
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	{"task_kfunc_release_null", "arg#0 is ptr_or_null_ expected ptr_ or socket"},
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						{"task_kfunc_release_null", "arg#0 is ptr_or_null_ expected ptr_ or socket"},
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	{"task_kfunc_release_unacquired", "release kernel function bpf_task_release expects"},
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						{"task_kfunc_release_unacquired", "release kernel function bpf_task_release expects"},
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	{"task_kfunc_from_pid_no_null_check", "arg#0 is ptr_or_null_ expected ptr_ or socket"},
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						{"task_kfunc_from_pid_no_null_check", "arg#0 is ptr_or_null_ expected ptr_ or socket"},
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						{"task_kfunc_from_lsm_task_free", "reg type unsupported for arg#0 function"},
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};
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					};
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static void verify_fail(const char *prog_name, const char *expected_err_msg)
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					static void verify_fail(const char *prog_name, const char *expected_err_msg)
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					@ -271,3 +271,14 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_from_pid_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 cl
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	return 0;
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						return 0;
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}
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					}
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					SEC("lsm/task_free")
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					int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_from_lsm_task_free, struct task_struct *task)
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					{
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						struct task_struct *acquired;
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						/* the argument of lsm task_free hook is untrusted. */
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						acquired = bpf_task_acquire(task);
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						bpf_task_release(acquired);
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						return 0;
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					}
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