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	security: Define CAP_SYSLOG
Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set. With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c). Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm Changelog: nov 22 2010: . port to new kernel . add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-By: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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					 3 changed files with 13 additions and 4 deletions
				
			
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					@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
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/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
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					/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
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/* Allow administration of the random device */
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					/* Allow administration of the random device */
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/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
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					/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
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/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
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/* Allow setting the domainname */
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					/* Allow setting the domainname */
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/* Allow setting the hostname */
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					/* Allow setting the hostname */
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/* Allow calling bdflush() */
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					/* Allow calling bdflush() */
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					@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
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#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
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					#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
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#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_MAC_ADMIN
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					/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
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					#define CAP_SYSLOG           34
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					#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SYSLOG
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#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
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					#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
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					@ -283,9 +283,15 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
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			return -EPERM;
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								return -EPERM;
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		if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
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							if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
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		     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
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							     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
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		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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							    !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) {
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								/* remove after 2.6.38 */
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								if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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									WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with "
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									  "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG "
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									  "(deprecated and denied).\n");
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			return -EPERM;
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								return -EPERM;
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		}
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							}
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						}
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	error = security_syslog(type);
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						error = security_syslog(type);
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	if (error)
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						if (error)
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					@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
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	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
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						    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
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	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
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						{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
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	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
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						{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
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	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
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						{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
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	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
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						{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
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	{ "tun_socket",
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						{ "tun_socket",
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	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
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						  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
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