mirrors/linux
1
0
Fork 1
mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git synced 2025-11-04 10:40:15 +02:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()

Browse source 
Some basic simplification and comment reformatting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Paul Moore 2013-07-23 17:38:39 -04:00 committed by Eric Paris
parent 96484348ad
commit eef9b41622
2 changed files with 42 additions and 60 deletions
repo.diff.show_diff_stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

17
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
View file

@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
}
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad);
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad);
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
return 0;
}
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad,
u8 proto)
{
return 0;
}

85
security/selinux/xfrm.c
View file

@ -367,14 +367,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
* we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
* gone thru the IPSec process.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct sec_path *sp;
u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sp = skb->sp;
int i;
struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
if (sp) {
for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
@ -382,23 +380,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* This check even when there's no association involved is
* intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
* process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
* explicitly allowed by policy.
*/
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
return rc;
/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
* according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
* non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
}
/*
@ -408,49 +400,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
* If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
* checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *dst_test;
for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
dst_test = dst_test->child) {
struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
goto out;
}
}
switch (proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
case IPPROTO_ESP:
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/*
* We should have already seen this packet once before
* it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
* unlabeled check.
*/
goto out;
/* We should have already seen this packet once before it
* underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
* check. */
return 0;
default:
break;
}
/*
* This check even when there's no association involved is
* intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
* process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
* explicitly allowed by policy.
*/
dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *iter;
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
out:
return rc;
for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) {
struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
return 0;
}
}
/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
* according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
* non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
}