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	capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities since the entire source file is about capabilities. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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					 1 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions
				
			
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			@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
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static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
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					  struct linux_binprm *bprm,
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					  bool *effective,
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					  bool *has_cap)
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					  bool *has_fcap)
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{
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	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
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	unsigned i;
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			@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
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		*effective = true;
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	if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
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		*has_cap = true;
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		*has_fcap = true;
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	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
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		__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
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			@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
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 * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
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 * constructed by execve().
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 */
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static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
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static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
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{
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	int rc = 0;
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	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
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			@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
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		goto out;
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	}
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	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
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	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
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	if (rc == -EINVAL)
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		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
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		       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
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			@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
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 * set UID root and nothing is changed.  If we are root, cap_permitted is
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 * updated.  If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
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 */
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static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
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static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
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				   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
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{
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	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
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			@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
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	 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
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	 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
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	 */
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	if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
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	if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
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		warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
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		return;
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	}
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			@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
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	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
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	bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
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	bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
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	int ret;
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	kuid_t root_uid;
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	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
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		return -EPERM;
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	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
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	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
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	if (ret < 0)
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		return ret;
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	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
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	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
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	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
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	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
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	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
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			@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
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	/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
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	if (has_cap || is_setid)
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	if (has_fcap || is_setid)
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		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
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	/*
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