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		18b19abc37
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCaNZQgQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc oiFXAQCpbLvkWbld9wLgxUBhq+q+kw5NvGxzpvqIhXwJB9F9YAEA44/Wevln4xGx +kRUbP+xlRQqenIYs2dLzVHzAwAdfQ4= =EO4Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'namespace-6.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull namespace updates from Christian Brauner: "This contains a larger set of changes around the generic namespace infrastructure of the kernel. Each specific namespace type (net, cgroup, mnt, ...) embedds a struct ns_common which carries the reference count of the namespace and so on. We open-coded and cargo-culted so many quirks for each namespace type that it just wasn't scalable anymore. So given there's a bunch of new changes coming in that area I've started cleaning all of this up. The core change is to make it possible to correctly initialize every namespace uniformly and derive the correct initialization settings from the type of the namespace such as namespace operations, namespace type and so on. This leaves the new ns_common_init() function with a single parameter which is the specific namespace type which derives the correct parameters statically. This also means the compiler will yell as soon as someone does something remotely fishy. The ns_common_init() addition also allows us to remove ns_alloc_inum() and drops any special-casing of the initial network namespace in the network namespace initialization code that Linus complained about. Another part is reworking the reference counting. The reference counting was open-coded and copy-pasted for each namespace type even though they all followed the same rules. This also removes all open accesses to the reference count and makes it private and only uses a very small set of dedicated helpers to manipulate them just like we do for e.g., files. In addition this generalizes the mount namespace iteration infrastructure introduced a few cycles ago. As reminder, the vfs makes it possible to iterate sequentially and bidirectionally through all mount namespaces on the system or all mount namespaces that the caller holds privilege over. This allow userspace to iterate over all mounts in all mount namespaces using the listmount() and statmount() system call. Each mount namespace has a unique identifier for the lifetime of the systems that is exposed to userspace. The network namespace also has a unique identifier working exactly the same way. This extends the concept to all other namespace types. The new nstree type makes it possible to lookup namespaces purely by their identifier and to walk the namespace list sequentially and bidirectionally for all namespace types, allowing userspace to iterate through all namespaces. Looking up namespaces in the namespace tree works completely locklessly. This also means we can move the mount namespace onto the generic infrastructure and remove a bunch of code and members from struct mnt_namespace itself. There's a bunch of stuff coming on top of this in the future but for now this uses the generic namespace tree to extend a concept introduced first for pidfs a few cycles ago. For a while now we have supported pidfs file handles for pidfds. This has proven to be very useful. This extends the concept to cover namespaces as well. It is possible to encode and decode namespace file handles using the common name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() apis. As with pidfs file handles, namespace file handles are exhaustive, meaning it is not required to actually hold a reference to nsfs in able to decode aka open_by_handle_at() a namespace file handle. Instead the FD_NSFS_ROOT constant can be passed which will let the kernel grab a reference to the root of nsfs internally and thus decode the file handle. Namespaces file descriptors can already be derived from pidfds which means they aren't subject to overmount protection bugs. IOW, it's irrelevant if the caller would not have access to an appropriate /proc/<pid>/ns/ directory as they could always just derive the namespace based on a pidfd already. It has the same advantage as pidfds. It's possible to reliably and for the lifetime of the system refer to a namespace without pinning any resources and to compare them trivially. Permission checking is kept simple. If the caller is located in the namespace the file handle refers to they are able to open it otherwise they must hold privilege over the owning namespace of the relevant namespace. The namespace file handle layout is exposed as uapi and has a stable and extensible format. For now it simply contains the namespace identifier, the namespace type, and the inode number. The stable format means that userspace may construct its own namespace file handles without going through name_to_handle_at() as they are already allowed for pidfs and cgroup file handles" * tag 'namespace-6.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (65 commits) ns: drop assert ns: move ns type into struct ns_common nstree: make struct ns_tree private ns: add ns_debug() ns: simplify ns_common_init() further cgroup: add missing ns_common include ns: use inode initializer for initial namespaces selftests/namespaces: verify initial namespace inode numbers ns: rename to __ns_ref nsfs: port to ns_ref_*() helpers net: port to ns_ref_*() helpers uts: port to ns_ref_*() helpers ipv4: use check_net() net: use check_net() net-sysfs: use check_net() user: port to ns_ref_*() helpers time: port to ns_ref_*() helpers pid: port to ns_ref_*() helpers ipc: port to ns_ref_*() helpers cgroup: port to ns_ref_*() helpers ...
		
			
				
	
	
		
			462 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			11 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			462 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			11 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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| /*
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|  *  linux/fs/proc/root.c
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|  *
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|  *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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|  *
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|  *  proc root directory handling functions
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|  */
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| #include <linux/errno.h>
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| #include <linux/time.h>
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| #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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| #include <linux/stat.h>
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| #include <linux/init.h>
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| #include <linux/sched.h>
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| #include <linux/sched/stat.h>
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| #include <linux/module.h>
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| #include <linux/bitops.h>
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| #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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| #include <linux/fs_context.h>
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| #include <linux/mount.h>
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| #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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| #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
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| #include <linux/cred.h>
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| #include <linux/magic.h>
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| #include <linux/slab.h>
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| 
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| #include "internal.h"
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| 
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| struct proc_fs_context {
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| 	struct pid_namespace	*pid_ns;
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| 	unsigned int		mask;
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| 	enum proc_hidepid	hidepid;
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| 	int			gid;
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| 	enum proc_pidonly	pidonly;
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| };
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| 
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| enum proc_param {
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| 	Opt_gid,
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| 	Opt_hidepid,
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| 	Opt_subset,
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| 	Opt_pidns,
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| };
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| 
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| static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = {
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| 	fsparam_u32("gid",		Opt_gid),
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| 	fsparam_string("hidepid",	Opt_hidepid),
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| 	fsparam_string("subset",	Opt_subset),
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| 	fsparam_file_or_string("pidns",	Opt_pidns),
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| 	{}
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| };
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| 
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| static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
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| {
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| 	return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
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| 		value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
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| 		value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
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| 		value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE);
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_parse_hidepid_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 	struct fs_parameter_spec hidepid_u32_spec = fsparam_u32("hidepid", Opt_hidepid);
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| 	struct fs_parse_result result;
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| 	int base = (unsigned long)hidepid_u32_spec.data;
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| 
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| 	if (param->type != fs_value_is_string)
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| 		return invalf(fc, "proc: unexpected type of hidepid value\n");
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| 
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| 	if (!kstrtouint(param->string, base, &result.uint_32)) {
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| 		if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
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| 			return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
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| 		ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
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| 		return 0;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	if (!strcmp(param->string, "off"))
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| 		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_OFF;
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| 	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "noaccess"))
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| 		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS;
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| 	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "invisible"))
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| 		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_INVISIBLE;
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| 	else if (!strcmp(param->string, "ptraceable"))
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| 		ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE;
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| 	else
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| 		return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
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| 
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_parse_subset_param(struct fs_context *fc, char *value)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 
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| 	while (value) {
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| 		char *ptr = strchr(value, ',');
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| 
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| 		if (ptr != NULL)
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| 			*ptr++ = '\0';
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| 
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| 		if (*value != '\0') {
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| 			if (!strcmp(value, "pid")) {
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| 				ctx->pidonly = PROC_PIDONLY_ON;
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| 			} else {
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| 				return invalf(fc, "proc: unsupported subset option - %s\n", value);
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| 			}
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| 		}
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| 		value = ptr;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
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| static int proc_parse_pidns_param(struct fs_context *fc,
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| 				  struct fs_parameter *param,
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| 				  struct fs_parse_result *result)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 	struct pid_namespace *target, *active = task_active_pid_ns(current);
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| 	struct ns_common *ns;
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| 	struct file *ns_filp __free(fput) = NULL;
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| 
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| 	switch (param->type) {
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| 	case fs_value_is_file:
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| 		/* came through fsconfig, steal the file reference */
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| 		ns_filp = no_free_ptr(param->file);
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| 		break;
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| 	case fs_value_is_string:
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| 		ns_filp = filp_open(param->string, O_RDONLY, 0);
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| 		break;
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| 	default:
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| 		WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
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| 		break;
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| 	}
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| 	if (!ns_filp)
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| 		ns_filp = ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
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| 	if (IS_ERR(ns_filp)) {
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| 		errorfc(fc, "could not get file from pidns argument");
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| 		return PTR_ERR(ns_filp);
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	if (!proc_ns_file(ns_filp))
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| 		return invalfc(fc, "pidns argument is not an nsfs file");
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| 	ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(ns_filp));
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| 	if (ns->ns_type != CLONE_NEWPID)
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| 		return invalfc(fc, "pidns argument is not a pidns file");
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| 	target = container_of(ns, struct pid_namespace, ns);
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * pidns= is shorthand for joining the pidns to get a fsopen fd, so the
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| 	 * permission model should be the same as pidns_install().
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| 	 */
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| 	if (!ns_capable(target->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
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| 		errorfc(fc, "insufficient permissions to set pidns");
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| 		return -EPERM;
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| 	}
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| 	if (!pidns_is_ancestor(target, active))
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| 		return invalfc(fc, "cannot set pidns to non-descendant pidns");
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| 
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| 	put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
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| 	ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(target);
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| 	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
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| 	fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ctx->pid_ns->user_ns);
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| #endif /* CONFIG_PID_NS */
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| 
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| static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 	struct fs_parse_result result;
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| 	int opt, err;
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| 
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| 	opt = fs_parse(fc, proc_fs_parameters, param, &result);
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| 	if (opt < 0)
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| 		return opt;
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| 
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| 	switch (opt) {
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| 	case Opt_gid:
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| 		ctx->gid = result.uint_32;
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| 		break;
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| 
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| 	case Opt_hidepid:
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| 		err = proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param);
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| 		if (err)
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| 			return err;
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| 		break;
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| 
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| 	case Opt_subset:
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| 		err = proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string);
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| 		if (err)
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| 			return err;
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| 		break;
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| 
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| 	case Opt_pidns:
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| #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
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| 		/*
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| 		 * We would have to RCU-protect every proc_pid_ns() or
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| 		 * proc_sb_info() access if we allowed this to be reconfigured
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| 		 * for an existing procfs instance. Luckily, procfs instances
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| 		 * are cheap to create, and mount-beneath would let you
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| 		 * atomically replace an instance even with overmounts.
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| 		 */
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| 		if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE) {
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| 			errorfc(fc, "cannot reconfigure pidns for existing procfs");
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| 			return -EBUSY;
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| 		}
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| 		err = proc_parse_pidns_param(fc, param, &result);
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| 		if (err)
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| 			return err;
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| 		break;
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| #else
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| 		errorfc(fc, "pidns mount flag not supported on this system");
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| 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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| #endif
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| 
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| 	default:
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| 		return -EINVAL;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	ctx->mask |= 1 << opt;
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
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| 			       struct fs_context *fc,
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| 			       struct user_namespace *user_ns)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 
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| 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid))
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| 		fs_info->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
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| 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid))
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| 		fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
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| 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset))
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| 		fs_info->pidonly = ctx->pidonly;
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| 	if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_pidns) &&
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| 	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_RECONFIGURE)) {
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| 		put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
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| 		fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 	struct inode *root_inode;
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| 	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
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| 	int ret;
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| 
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| 	fs_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 	if (!fs_info)
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| 		return -ENOMEM;
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| 
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| 	fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
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| 	proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
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| 
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| 	/* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
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| 	s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
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| 	s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
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| 	s->s_blocksize = 1024;
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| 	s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
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| 	s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
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| 	s->s_op = &proc_sops;
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| 	s->s_time_gran = 1;
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| 	s->s_fs_info = fs_info;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
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| 	 * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
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| 	 * top of it
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| 	 */
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| 	s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
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| 
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| 	/* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */
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| 	s->s_shrink->seeks = 0;
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| 
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| 	pde_get(&proc_root);
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| 	root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
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| 	if (!root_inode) {
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| 		pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
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| 		return -ENOMEM;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
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| 	if (!s->s_root) {
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| 		pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
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| 		return -ENOMEM;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	ret = proc_setup_self(s);
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| 	if (ret) {
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| 		return ret;
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| 	}
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| 	return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
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| {
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| 	struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
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| 	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
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| 
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| 	sync_filesystem(sb);
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| 
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| 	proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
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| {
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| 	return get_tree_nodev(fc, proc_fill_super);
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| }
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| 
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| static void proc_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
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| 
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| 	put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
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| 	kfree(ctx);
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| }
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| 
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| static const struct fs_context_operations proc_fs_context_ops = {
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| 	.free		= proc_fs_context_free,
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| 	.parse_param	= proc_parse_param,
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| 	.get_tree	= proc_get_tree,
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| 	.reconfigure	= proc_reconfigure,
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| };
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| 
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| static int proc_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_context *ctx;
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| 
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| 	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
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| 	if (!ctx)
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| 		return -ENOMEM;
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| 
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| 	ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
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| 	put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
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| 	fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ctx->pid_ns->user_ns);
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| 	fc->fs_private = ctx;
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| 	fc->ops = &proc_fs_context_ops;
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| 
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| static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
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| {
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| 	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
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| 
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| 	if (!fs_info) {
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| 		kill_anon_super(sb);
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| 		return;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	dput(fs_info->proc_self);
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| 	dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
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| 
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| 	kill_anon_super(sb);
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| 	put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
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| 	kfree_rcu(fs_info, rcu);
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| }
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| 
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| static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
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| 	.name			= "proc",
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| 	.init_fs_context	= proc_init_fs_context,
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| 	.parameters		= proc_fs_parameters,
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| 	.kill_sb		= proc_kill_sb,
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| 	.fs_flags		= FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_DISALLOW_NOTIFY_PERM,
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| };
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| 
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| void __init proc_root_init(void)
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| {
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| 	proc_init_kmemcache();
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| 	set_proc_pid_nlink();
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| 	proc_self_init();
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| 	proc_thread_self_init();
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| 	proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
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| 
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| 	proc_net_init();
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| 	proc_mkdir("fs", NULL);
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| 	proc_mkdir("driver", NULL);
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| 	proc_create_mount_point("fs/nfsd"); /* somewhere for the nfsd filesystem to be mounted */
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| #if defined(CONFIG_SUN_OPENPROMFS) || defined(CONFIG_SUN_OPENPROMFS_MODULE)
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| 	/* just give it a mountpoint */
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| 	proc_create_mount_point("openprom");
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| #endif
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| 	proc_tty_init();
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| 	proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
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| 	proc_sys_init();
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Last things last. It is not like userspace processes eager
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| 	 * to open /proc files exist at this point but register last
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| 	 * anyway.
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| 	 */
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| 	register_filesystem(&proc_fs_type);
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| }
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| 
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| static int proc_root_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
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| 			     const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
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| 			     u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
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| {
 | |
| 	generic_fillattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, request_mask, d_inode(path->dentry),
 | |
| 			 stat);
 | |
| 	stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes();
 | |
| 	return 0;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsigned int flags)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	if (!proc_pid_lookup(dentry, flags))
 | |
| 		return NULL;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return proc_lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static int proc_root_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	if (ctx->pos < FIRST_PROCESS_ENTRY) {
 | |
| 		int error = proc_readdir(file, ctx);
 | |
| 		if (unlikely(error <= 0))
 | |
| 			return error;
 | |
| 		ctx->pos = FIRST_PROCESS_ENTRY;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return proc_pid_readdir(file, ctx);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| /*
 | |
|  * The root /proc directory is special, as it has the
 | |
|  * <pid> directories. Thus we don't use the generic
 | |
|  * directory handling functions for that..
 | |
|  */
 | |
| static const struct file_operations proc_root_operations = {
 | |
| 	.read		 = generic_read_dir,
 | |
| 	.iterate_shared	 = proc_root_readdir,
 | |
| 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 | |
| };
 | |
| 
 | |
| /*
 | |
|  * proc root can do almost nothing..
 | |
|  */
 | |
| static const struct inode_operations proc_root_inode_operations = {
 | |
| 	.lookup		= proc_root_lookup,
 | |
| 	.getattr	= proc_root_getattr,
 | |
| };
 | |
| 
 | |
| /*
 | |
|  * This is the root "inode" in the /proc tree..
 | |
|  */
 | |
| struct proc_dir_entry proc_root = {
 | |
| 	.low_ino	= PROCFS_ROOT_INO,
 | |
| 	.namelen	= 5,
 | |
| 	.mode		= S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
 | |
| 	.nlink		= 2,
 | |
| 	.refcnt		= REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
 | |
| 	.proc_iops	= &proc_root_inode_operations,
 | |
| 	.proc_dir_ops	= &proc_root_operations,
 | |
| 	.parent		= &proc_root,
 | |
| 	.subdir		= RB_ROOT,
 | |
| 	.name		= "/proc",
 | |
| };
 |