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	Due to inconsistencies in the way we manipulate compat GPRs, we have a few issues today: * For audit and tracing, where error codes are handled as a (native) long, negative error codes are expected to be sign-extended to the native 64-bits, or they may fail to be matched correctly. Thus a syscall which fails with an error may erroneously be identified as failing. * For ptrace, *all* compat return values should be sign-extended for consistency with 32-bit arm, but we currently only do this for negative return codes. * As we may transiently set the upper 32 bits of some compat GPRs while in the kernel, these can be sampled by perf, which is somewhat confusing. This means that where a syscall returns a pointer above 2G, this will be sign-extended, but will not be mistaken for an error as error codes are constrained to the inclusive range [-4096, -1] where no user pointer can exist. To fix all of these, we must consistently use helpers to get/set the compat GPRs, ensuring that we never write the upper 32 bits of the return code, and always sign-extend when reading the return code. This patch does so, with the following changes: * We re-organise syscall_get_return_value() to always sign-extend for compat tasks, and reimplement syscall_get_error() atop. We update syscall_trace_exit() to use syscall_get_return_value(). * We consistently use syscall_set_return_value() to set the return value, ensureing the upper 32 bits are never set unexpectedly. * As the core audit code currently uses regs_return_value() rather than syscall_get_return_value(), we special-case this for compat_user_mode(regs) such that this will do the right thing. Going forward, we should try to move the core audit code over to syscall_get_return_value(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Reported-by: weiyuchen <weiyuchen3@huawei.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802104200.21390-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			190 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			5.4 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			190 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			5.4 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <asm/daifflags.h>
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#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
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#include <asm/exception.h>
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#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
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#include <asm/syscall.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno);
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long sys_ni_syscall(void);
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static long do_ni_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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	long ret;
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	if (is_compat_task()) {
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		ret = compat_arm_syscall(regs, scno);
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		if (ret != -ENOSYS)
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			return ret;
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	}
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#endif
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	return sys_ni_syscall();
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}
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static long __invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, syscall_fn_t syscall_fn)
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{
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	return syscall_fn(regs);
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}
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static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
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			   unsigned int sc_nr,
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			   const syscall_fn_t syscall_table[])
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{
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	long ret;
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	add_random_kstack_offset();
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	if (scno < sc_nr) {
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		syscall_fn_t syscall_fn;
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		syscall_fn = syscall_table[array_index_nospec(scno, sc_nr)];
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		ret = __invoke_syscall(regs, syscall_fn);
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	} else {
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		ret = do_ni_syscall(regs, scno);
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	}
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	syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, 0, ret);
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	/*
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	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
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	 * but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
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	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
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	 *
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	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
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	 * applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
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	 * 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
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	 *
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	 * The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
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	 */
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	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int() & 0x1FF);
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}
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static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)
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{
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	return unlikely(flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK);
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}
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int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
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void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
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static void el0_svc_common(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno, int sc_nr,
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			   const syscall_fn_t syscall_table[])
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{
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	unsigned long flags = current_thread_info()->flags;
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	regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
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	regs->syscallno = scno;
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	/*
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	 * BTI note:
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	 * The architecture does not guarantee that SPSR.BTYPE is zero
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	 * on taking an SVC, so we could return to userspace with a
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	 * non-zero BTYPE after the syscall.
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	 *
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	 * This shouldn't matter except when userspace is explicitly
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	 * doing something stupid, such as setting PROT_BTI on a page
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	 * that lacks conforming BTI/PACIxSP instructions, falling
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	 * through from one executable page to another with differing
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	 * PROT_BTI, or messing with BTYPE via ptrace: in such cases,
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	 * userspace should not be surprised if a SIGILL occurs on
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	 * syscall return.
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	 *
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	 * So, don't touch regs->pstate & PSR_BTYPE_MASK here.
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	 * (Similarly for HVC and SMC elsewhere.)
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	 */
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	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
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	if (flags & _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) {
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		/*
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		 * Process the asynchronous tag check fault before the actual
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		 * syscall. do_notify_resume() will send a signal to userspace
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		 * before the syscall is restarted.
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		 */
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		syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ERESTARTNOINTR, 0);
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		return;
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	}
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	if (has_syscall_work(flags)) {
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		/*
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		 * The de-facto standard way to skip a system call using ptrace
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		 * is to set the system call to -1 (NO_SYSCALL) and set x0 to a
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		 * suitable error code for consumption by userspace. However,
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		 * this cannot be distinguished from a user-issued syscall(-1)
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		 * and so we must set x0 to -ENOSYS here in case the tracer doesn't
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		 * issue the skip and we fall into trace_exit with x0 preserved.
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		 *
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		 * This is slightly odd because it also means that if a tracer
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		 * sets the system call number to -1 but does not initialise x0,
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		 * then x0 will be preserved for all system calls apart from a
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		 * user-issued syscall(-1). However, requesting a skip and not
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		 * setting the return value is unlikely to do anything sensible
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		 * anyway.
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		 */
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		if (scno == NO_SYSCALL)
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			syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
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		scno = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
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		if (scno == NO_SYSCALL)
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			goto trace_exit;
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	}
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	invoke_syscall(regs, scno, sc_nr, syscall_table);
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	/*
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	 * The tracing status may have changed under our feet, so we have to
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	 * check again. However, if we were tracing entry, then we always trace
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	 * exit regardless, as the old entry assembly did.
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	 */
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	if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RSEQ)) {
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		local_daif_mask();
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		flags = current_thread_info()->flags;
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		if (!has_syscall_work(flags) && !(flags & _TIF_SINGLESTEP))
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			return;
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		local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
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	}
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trace_exit:
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	syscall_trace_exit(regs);
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}
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static inline void sve_user_discard(void)
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{
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	if (!system_supports_sve())
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		return;
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	clear_thread_flag(TIF_SVE);
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	/*
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	 * task_fpsimd_load() won't be called to update CPACR_EL1 in
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	 * ret_to_user unless TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE is still set, which only
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	 * happens if a context switch or kernel_neon_begin() or context
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	 * modification (sigreturn, ptrace) intervenes.
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	 * So, ensure that CPACR_EL1 is already correct for the fast-path case.
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	 */
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	sve_user_disable();
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}
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void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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	sve_user_discard();
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	el0_svc_common(regs, regs->regs[8], __NR_syscalls, sys_call_table);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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	el0_svc_common(regs, regs->regs[7], __NR_compat_syscalls,
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		       compat_sys_call_table);
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}
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#endif
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