forked from mirrors/gecko-dev
Bug 1571934 - Inline security-prefs.js into all.js. r=keeler
security-prefs.js is #included into greprefs.js, but there's no good reason for it to be separate from all.js. Having it separate makes it easier to overlook, and all.js has a bunch of `security.*` prefs in it anyway. This patch inlines it into all.js. It inlines it at the start of the file to minimize the risk of the change, so that the prefs end up in greprefs.js in the same order as before. Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D40919 --HG-- extra : moz-landing-system : lando
This commit is contained in:
parent
0637bfef3e
commit
b256ece713
6 changed files with 186 additions and 194 deletions
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@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ remote/server/Stream.jsm
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remote/test/browser/chrome-remote-interface.js
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remote/test/demo.js
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# security/ exclusions (pref files).
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security/manager/ssl/security-prefs.js
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# NSS / taskcluster only.
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security/nss/**
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@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ modules/libpref/test/unit/data/testPrefLocked.js
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modules/libpref/test/unit/data/testPrefSticky.js
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modules/libpref/test/unit/extdata/testExt.js
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remote/pref/remote.js
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security/manager/ssl/security-prefs.js
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services/common/services-common.js
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services/sync/services-sync.js
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services/sync/tests/unit/prefs_test_prefs_store.js
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@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
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#include ../../security/manager/ssl/security-prefs.js
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#include init/all.js
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#include ../../devtools/shared/preferences/devtools-shared.js
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#ifdef MOZ_DATA_REPORTING
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@ -15,6 +15,191 @@
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* modules/libpref/parser/src/lib.rs.
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*/
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pref("security.tls.version.min", 1);
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pref("security.tls.version.max", 4);
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pref("security.tls.version.fallback-limit", 4);
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pref("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts", "");
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pref("security.tls.enable_0rtt_data", false);
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// Turn off post-handshake authentication for TLS 1.3 by default,
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// until the incompatibility with HTTP/2 is resolved:
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-http2-tls13-00
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pref("security.tls.enable_post_handshake_auth", false);
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.tls.hello_downgrade_check", false);
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#else
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pref("security.tls.hello_downgrade_check", true);
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#endif
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pref("security.tls.enable_delegated_credentials", false);
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pref("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", false);
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pref("security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation", false);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", true);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_alpn", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_des_ede3_sha", true);
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pref("security.content.signature.root_hash",
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"97:E8:BA:9C:F1:2F:B3:DE:53:CC:42:A4:E6:57:7E:D6:4D:F4:93:C2:47:B4:14:FE:A0:36:81:8D:38:23:56:0E");
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pref("security.default_personal_cert", "Ask Every Time");
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pref("security.remember_cert_checkbox_default_setting", true);
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pref("security.ask_for_password", 0);
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pref("security.password_lifetime", 30);
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// On Windows 8.1, if the following preference is 2, we will attempt to detect
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// if the Family Safety TLS interception feature has been enabled. If so, we
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// will behave as if the enterprise roots feature has been enabled (i.e. import
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// and trust third party root certificates from the OS).
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// With any other value of the pref or on any other platform, this does nothing.
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// This preference takes precedence over "security.enterprise_roots.enabled".
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pref("security.family_safety.mode", 2);
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pref("security.enterprise_roots.enabled", false);
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// The supported values of this pref are:
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// 0: do not fetch OCSP
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// 1: fetch OCSP for DV and EV certificates
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// 2: fetch OCSP only for EV certificates
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pref("security.OCSP.enabled", 1);
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pref("security.OCSP.require", false);
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft", 2000);
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#else
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft", 1000);
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#endif
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.hard", 10000);
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pref("security.pki.cert_short_lifetime_in_days", 10);
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// NB: Changes to this pref affect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry.
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// See the comment in CertVerifier.cpp.
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// 3 = only allow SHA-1 for certificates issued by an imported root.
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pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
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// This preference controls what signature algorithms are accepted for signed
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// apps (i.e. add-ons). The number is interpreted as a bit mask with the
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// following semantic:
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// The lowest order bit determines which PKCS#7 algorithms are accepted.
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// xxx_0_: SHA-1 and/or SHA-256 PKCS#7 allowed
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// xxx_1_: SHA-256 PKCS#7 allowed
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// The next two bits determine whether COSE is required and PKCS#7 is allowed
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// x_00_x: COSE disabled, ignore files, PKCS#7 must verify
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// x_01_x: COSE is verified if present, PKCS#7 must verify
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// x_10_x: COSE is required, PKCS#7 must verify if present
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// x_11_x: COSE is required, PKCS#7 disabled (fail when present)
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pref("security.signed_app_signatures.policy", 2);
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// security.pki.name_matching_mode controls how the platform matches hostnames
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// to name information in TLS certificates. The possible values are:
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// 0: always fall back to the subject common name if necessary (as in, if the
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// subject alternative name extension is either not present or does not
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// contain any DNS names or IP addresses)
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// 1: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
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// August 2016 if necessary
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// 2: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
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// August 2015 if necessary
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// 3: only use name information from the subject alternative name extension
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pref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 3);
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// security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy controls how the platform handles the
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// id-Netscape-stepUp OID in extended key usage extensions of CA certificates.
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// 0: id-Netscape-stepUp is always considered equivalent to id-kp-serverAuth
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// 1: it is considered equivalent when the notBefore is before 23 August 2016
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// 2: similarly, but for 23 August 2015
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// 3: it is never considered equivalent
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 1);
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#else
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pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 2);
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#endif
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// Configures Certificate Transparency support mode:
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// 0: Fully disabled.
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// 1: Only collect telemetry. CT qualification checks are not performed.
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pref("security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode", 0);
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// Only one of ["enable_softtoken", "enable_usbtoken",
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// "webauthn_enable_android_fido2"] should be true at a time, as the
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// softtoken will override the other two. Note android's pref is set in
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// mobile.js / geckoview-prefs.js
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pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_softtoken", false);
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#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID
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// the Rust usbtoken support does not function on Android
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pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_usbtoken", false);
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#else
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pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_usbtoken", true);
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#endif
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pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled", true);
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pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.url", "https://incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org/submit/sslreports/");
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pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.automatic", false);
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// Impose a maximum age on HPKP headers, to avoid sites getting permanently
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// blacking themselves out by setting a bad pin. (60 days by default)
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.1
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pref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", 5184000);
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// security.pki.distrust_ca_policy controls what root program distrust policies
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// are enforced at this time:
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// 0: No distrust policies enforced
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// 1: Symantec roots distrusted for certificates issued after cutoff
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// 2: Symantec roots distrusted regardless of date
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// See https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Upcoming_Distrust_Actions for more details.
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pref("security.pki.distrust_ca_policy", 2);
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// Issuer we use to detect MitM proxies. Set to the issuer of the cert of the
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// Firefox update service. The string format is whatever NSS uses to print a DN.
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// This value is set and cleared automatically.
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pref("security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer", "");
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// Pref to disable the MitM proxy checks.
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pref("security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer.enabled", true);
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// It is set to true when a non-built-in root certificate is detected on a
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// Firefox update service's connection.
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// This value is set automatically.
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// The difference between security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer and this pref is that
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// here the root is trusted but not a built-in, whereas for
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// security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer.enabled, the root is not trusted.
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pref("security.pki.mitm_detected", false);
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// Intermediate CA Preloading settings
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#if defined(RELEASE_OR_BETA) || defined(MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID)
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.enabled", false);
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#else
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.enabled", true);
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#endif
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.bucket", "security-state");
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.collection", "intermediates");
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.checked", 0);
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.downloads_per_poll", 100);
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.parallel_downloads", 8);
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pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.signer", "onecrl.content-signature.mozilla.org");
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#if defined(RELEASE_OR_BETA) || defined(MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID)
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.enabled", false);
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#else
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.enabled", true);
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#endif
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.bucket", "security-state");
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.collection", "cert-revocations");
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.checked", 0);
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pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.signer", "onecrl.content-signature.mozilla.org");
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pref("general.useragent.compatMode.firefox", false);
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// This pref exists only for testing purposes. In order to disable all
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@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ void nsNSSComponent::UpdateCertVerifierWithEnterpriseRoots() {
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// Enable the TLS versions given in the prefs, defaulting to TLS 1.0 (min) and
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// TLS 1.2 (max) when the prefs aren't set or set to invalid values.
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nsresult nsNSSComponent::setEnabledTLSVersions() {
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// keep these values in sync with security-prefs.js
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// Keep these values in sync with all.js.
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// 1 means TLS 1.0, 2 means TLS 1.1, etc.
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static const uint32_t PSM_DEFAULT_MIN_TLS_VERSION = 1;
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static const uint32_t PSM_DEFAULT_MAX_TLS_VERSION = 4;
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@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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pref("security.tls.version.min", 1);
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pref("security.tls.version.max", 4);
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pref("security.tls.version.fallback-limit", 4);
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pref("security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts", "");
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pref("security.tls.enable_0rtt_data", false);
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// Turn off post-handshake authentication for TLS 1.3 by default,
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// until the incompatibility with HTTP/2 is resolved:
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-http2-tls13-00
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pref("security.tls.enable_post_handshake_auth", false);
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.tls.hello_downgrade_check", false);
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#else
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pref("security.tls.hello_downgrade_check", true);
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#endif
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pref("security.tls.enable_delegated_credentials", false);
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pref("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", false);
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pref("security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation", false);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", true);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_alpn", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha256", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.dhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_128_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_aes_256_sha", true);
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pref("security.ssl3.rsa_des_ede3_sha", true);
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pref("security.content.signature.root_hash",
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"97:E8:BA:9C:F1:2F:B3:DE:53:CC:42:A4:E6:57:7E:D6:4D:F4:93:C2:47:B4:14:FE:A0:36:81:8D:38:23:56:0E");
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pref("security.default_personal_cert", "Ask Every Time");
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pref("security.remember_cert_checkbox_default_setting", true);
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pref("security.ask_for_password", 0);
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pref("security.password_lifetime", 30);
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// On Windows 8.1, if the following preference is 2, we will attempt to detect
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// if the Family Safety TLS interception feature has been enabled. If so, we
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// will behave as if the enterprise roots feature has been enabled (i.e. import
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// and trust third party root certificates from the OS).
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// With any other value of the pref or on any other platform, this does nothing.
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// This preference takes precedence over "security.enterprise_roots.enabled".
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pref("security.family_safety.mode", 2);
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pref("security.enterprise_roots.enabled", false);
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// The supported values of this pref are:
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// 0: do not fetch OCSP
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// 1: fetch OCSP for DV and EV certificates
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// 2: fetch OCSP only for EV certificates
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pref("security.OCSP.enabled", 1);
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pref("security.OCSP.require", false);
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft", 2000);
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#else
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft", 1000);
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#endif
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pref("security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.hard", 10000);
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pref("security.pki.cert_short_lifetime_in_days", 10);
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// NB: Changes to this pref affect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry.
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// See the comment in CertVerifier.cpp.
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// 3 = only allow SHA-1 for certificates issued by an imported root.
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pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 3);
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// This preference controls what signature algorithms are accepted for signed
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// apps (i.e. add-ons). The number is interpreted as a bit mask with the
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// following semantic:
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// The lowest order bit determines which PKCS#7 algorithms are accepted.
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// xxx_0_: SHA-1 and/or SHA-256 PKCS#7 allowed
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// xxx_1_: SHA-256 PKCS#7 allowed
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// The next two bits determine whether COSE is required and PKCS#7 is allowed
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// x_00_x: COSE disabled, ignore files, PKCS#7 must verify
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// x_01_x: COSE is verified if present, PKCS#7 must verify
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// x_10_x: COSE is required, PKCS#7 must verify if present
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// x_11_x: COSE is required, PKCS#7 disabled (fail when present)
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pref("security.signed_app_signatures.policy", 2);
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// security.pki.name_matching_mode controls how the platform matches hostnames
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// to name information in TLS certificates. The possible values are:
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// 0: always fall back to the subject common name if necessary (as in, if the
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// subject alternative name extension is either not present or does not
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// contain any DNS names or IP addresses)
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// 1: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
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// August 2016 if necessary
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// 2: fall back to the subject common name for certificates valid before 23
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// August 2015 if necessary
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// 3: only use name information from the subject alternative name extension
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pref("security.pki.name_matching_mode", 3);
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// security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy controls how the platform handles the
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// id-Netscape-stepUp OID in extended key usage extensions of CA certificates.
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// 0: id-Netscape-stepUp is always considered equivalent to id-kp-serverAuth
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// 1: it is considered equivalent when the notBefore is before 23 August 2016
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// 2: similarly, but for 23 August 2015
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// 3: it is never considered equivalent
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#ifdef RELEASE_OR_BETA
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pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 1);
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#else
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pref("security.pki.netscape_step_up_policy", 2);
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#endif
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// Configures Certificate Transparency support mode:
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// 0: Fully disabled.
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// 1: Only collect telemetry. CT qualification checks are not performed.
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pref("security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode", 0);
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// Only one of ["enable_softtoken", "enable_usbtoken",
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// "webauthn_enable_android_fido2"] should be true at a time, as the
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// softtoken will override the other two. Note android's pref is set in
|
||||
// mobile.js / geckoview-prefs.js
|
||||
pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_softtoken", false);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID
|
||||
// the Rust usbtoken support does not function on Android
|
||||
pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_usbtoken", false);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
pref("security.webauth.webauthn_enable_usbtoken", true);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled", true);
|
||||
pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.url", "https://incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org/submit/sslreports/");
|
||||
pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.automatic", false);
|
||||
|
||||
// Impose a maximum age on HPKP headers, to avoid sites getting permanently
|
||||
// blacking themselves out by setting a bad pin. (60 days by default)
|
||||
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-4.1
|
||||
pref("security.cert_pinning.max_max_age_seconds", 5184000);
|
||||
|
||||
// security.pki.distrust_ca_policy controls what root program distrust policies
|
||||
// are enforced at this time:
|
||||
// 0: No distrust policies enforced
|
||||
// 1: Symantec roots distrusted for certificates issued after cutoff
|
||||
// 2: Symantec roots distrusted regardless of date
|
||||
// See https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Upcoming_Distrust_Actions for more details.
|
||||
pref("security.pki.distrust_ca_policy", 2);
|
||||
|
||||
// Issuer we use to detect MitM proxies. Set to the issuer of the cert of the
|
||||
// Firefox update service. The string format is whatever NSS uses to print a DN.
|
||||
// This value is set and cleared automatically.
|
||||
pref("security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer", "");
|
||||
// Pref to disable the MitM proxy checks.
|
||||
pref("security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer.enabled", true);
|
||||
|
||||
// It is set to true when a non-built-in root certificate is detected on a
|
||||
// Firefox update service's connection.
|
||||
// This value is set automatically.
|
||||
// The difference between security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer and this pref is that
|
||||
// here the root is trusted but not a built-in, whereas for
|
||||
// security.pki.mitm_canary_issuer.enabled, the root is not trusted.
|
||||
pref("security.pki.mitm_detected", false);
|
||||
|
||||
// Intermediate CA Preloading settings
|
||||
#if defined(RELEASE_OR_BETA) || defined(MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID)
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.enabled", false);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.enabled", true);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.bucket", "security-state");
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.collection", "intermediates");
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.checked", 0);
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.downloads_per_poll", 100);
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.parallel_downloads", 8);
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.intermediates.signer", "onecrl.content-signature.mozilla.org");
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(RELEASE_OR_BETA) || defined(MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID)
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.enabled", false);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.enabled", true);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.bucket", "security-state");
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.collection", "cert-revocations");
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.checked", 0);
|
||||
pref("security.remote_settings.crlite_filters.signer", "onecrl.content-signature.mozilla.org");
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue