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fune/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c
Franziskus Kiefer 12beb018dd Bug 1317947 - land NSS 0x5f2db99c258f, r=me 
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 6afc6f20c26a9a32afa42c6b47f2775ca7fd91a3
2016-12-02 12:20:41 +01:00

2583 lines
86 KiB
C
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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "blapit.h"
#include "prinit.h"
#include "ssl3ext.h"
#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
#include "tls13exthandle.h" /* For tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn. */
static unsigned char key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN];
static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_enc_key = NULL;
static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_mac_key = NULL;
static PRCallOnceType generate_session_keys_once;
static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss,
SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket);
static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf,
PRUint32 bytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num,
PRInt32 lenSize);
static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(sslSocket *ss,
PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key);
static SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes);
/*
* Write bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure
* cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function
* on a shallow copy of the structure.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes)
{
if (bytes > item->len)
return SECFailure;
PORT_Memcpy(item->data, buf, bytes);
item->data += bytes;
item->len -= bytes;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Write a number in network byte order. Using this function means the
* SECItem structure cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call
* this function on a shallow copy of the structure.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint8 b[4];
PRUint8 *p = b;
switch (lenSize) {
case 4:
*p++ = (PRUint8)(num >> 24);
case 3:
*p++ = (PRUint8)(num >> 16);
case 2:
*p++ = (PRUint8)(num >> 8);
case 1:
*p = (PRUint8)num;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(item, &b[0], lenSize);
return rv;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(void *appData, void *nssData)
{
if (session_ticket_enc_key) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_enc_key);
session_ticket_enc_key = NULL;
}
if (session_ticket_mac_key) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_mac_key);
session_ticket_mac_key = NULL;
}
PORT_Memset(&generate_session_keys_once, 0,
sizeof(generate_session_keys_once));
return SECSuccess;
}
static PRStatus
ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys(void *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
sslSocket *ss = (sslSocket *)data;
sslServerCertType certType = { ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, NULL };
const sslServerCert *sc;
SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey;
SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey;
sc = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, &certType);
if (!sc || !sc->serverKeyPair) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: No ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt cert and key pair",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto loser;
}
svrPrivKey = sc->serverKeyPair->privKey;
svrPubKey = sc->serverKeyPair->pubKey;
if (svrPrivKey == NULL || svrPubKey == NULL) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Pub or priv key(s) is NULL.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto loser;
}
/* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */
PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX,
sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX));
if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeys(svrPrivKey, svrPubKey, ss->pkcs11PinArg,
&key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN],
&session_ticket_enc_key, &session_ticket_mac_key))
return PR_FAILURE;
rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown, NULL);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
return PR_SUCCESS;
loser:
ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(NULL, NULL);
return PR_FAILURE;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key,
PK11SymKey **mac_key)
{
if (PR_CallOnceWithArg(&generate_session_keys_once,
ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys, ss) !=
PR_SUCCESS)
return SECFailure;
if (session_ticket_enc_key == NULL ||
session_ticket_mac_key == NULL)
return SECFailure;
*aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key;
*mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL,
* unless that name is a dotted decimal string.
* Used by client and server.
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_SendServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss)
return 0;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
PRUint32 len;
PRNetAddr netAddr;
/* must have a hostname */
if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0])
return 0;
/* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */
if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) {
/* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */
return 0;
}
len = PORT_Strlen(ss->url);
if (append && maxBytes >= len + 9) {
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* length of extension_data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 5, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* length of server_name_list */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 3, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshake(ss, "\0", 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* HostName (length and value) */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, (PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_server_name_xtn;
}
}
return len + 9;
}
/* Server side */
if (append && maxBytes >= 4) {
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* length of extension_data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
}
return 4;
}
/* Handle an incoming SNI extension. */
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECItem *names = NULL;
PRUint32 listLenBytes = 0;
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
return SECSuccess; /* ignore extension */
}
/* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */
/* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */
if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* length of server_name_list */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &listLenBytes, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* alert already sent */
}
if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Read ServerNameList. */
while (data->len > 0) {
SECItem tmp;
PRUint32 type;
/* Read Name Type. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &type, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* alert sent in ConsumeHandshakeNumber */
goto loser;
}
/* Read ServerName (length and value). */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Record the value for host_name(0). */
if (type == sni_nametype_hostname) {
/* Fail if we encounter a second host_name entry. */
if (names) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Create an array for the only supported NameType. */
names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, 1);
if (!names) {
goto loser;
}
/* Copy ServerName into the array. */
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &names[0], &tmp) != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
/* Even if we don't support NameTypes other than host_name at the
* moment, we continue parsing the whole list to check its validity.
* We do not check for duplicate entries with NameType != host_name(0).
*/
}
if (names) {
/* Free old and set the new data. */
ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(xtnData);
xtnData->sniNameArr = names;
xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 1;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn;
}
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
loser:
if (names) {
PORT_Free(names);
}
return SECFailure;
}
/* Frees a given xtnData->sniNameArr and its elements. */
void
ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(TLSExtensionData *xtnData)
{
PRUint32 i;
if (!xtnData->sniNameArr) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < xtnData->sniNameArrSize; i++) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->sniNameArr[i], PR_FALSE);
}
PORT_Free(xtnData->sniNameArr);
xtnData->sniNameArr = NULL;
xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 0;
}
/* Called by both clients and servers.
* Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise
* sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets.
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn(
const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL;
sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
/* Never send an extension with a ticket for TLS 1.3, but
* OK to send the empty one in case the server does 1.2. */
if (sid->cached == in_client_cache &&
sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return 0;
}
/* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets)
return 0;
/* Empty extension length = extension_type (2-bytes) +
* length(extension_data) (2-bytes)
*/
extension_length = 4;
/* If we are a client then send a session ticket if one is availble.
* Servers that support the extension and are willing to negotiate the
* the extension always respond with an empty extension.
*/
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
/* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot
* just acquire and release the lock within this function because the
* caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be
* consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller
* will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're
* attempting to resume an existing session.
*/
session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
if (session_ticket->ticket.data) {
if (xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified) {
extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
} else if (!append &&
(session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 ||
(session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint +
session_ticket->received_timestamp >
ssl_Time()))) {
extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_TRUE;
}
}
}
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data &&
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified) {
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, session_ticket->ticket.data,
session_ticket->ticket.len, 2);
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
} else {
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_session_ticket_xtn;
}
}
return extension_length;
loser:
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
return -1;
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data,
EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket)
{
if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->key_name,
SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) !=
SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->iv,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE) !=
SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &enc_session_ticket->encrypted_state,
2, &data->data, &data->len) !=
SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->mac,
TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH) !=
SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (data->len != 0) /* Make sure that we have consumed all bytes. */
return SECFailure;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) {
/* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
/* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling
* ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the
* extension back to the client. */
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none
* of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of
* the block. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned int offset = 0;
while (offset < length) {
unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int)data[offset];
/* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that
* store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings.
*/
if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) {
return SECFailure;
}
offset = newOffset;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* protocol selection handler for ALPN (server side) and NPN (client side) */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
unsigned char resultBuffer[255];
SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 };
rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return rv;
}
PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback);
/* For ALPN, the cipher suite isn't selected yet. Note that extensions
* sometimes affect what cipher suite is selected, e.g., for ECC. */
PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo &
ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite) ==
(ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite));
rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len,
result.data, &result.len, sizeof(resultBuffer));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* Expect callback to call PORT_SetError() */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
/* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our
* stack. */
if (result.len > sizeof(resultBuffer)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
/* TODO: crash */
return SECFailure;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE);
if (ex_type == ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn &&
xtnData->nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
/* The callback might say OK, but then it picks a default value - one
* that was not listed. That's OK for NPN, but not ALPN. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &result);
}
/* handle an incoming ALPN extension at the server */
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 count;
SECStatus rv;
/* We expressly don't want to allow ALPN on renegotiation,
* despite it being permitted by the spec. */
if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len == 0) {
/* Clients MUST send a non-empty ALPN extension. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Unlike NPN, ALPN has extra redundant length information so that
* the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || count != data->len) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
/* we're not configured for it */
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ex_type, data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
/* prepare to send back a response, if we negotiated */
if (xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(
ss, xtnData, ex_type, ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) {
/* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what
* protocol to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate
* a different one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if
* we've negotiated NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake
* message. Thus, these two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the
* same connection. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
return SECFailure;
}
/* We should only get this call if we sent the extension, so
* ss->nextProtoCallback needs to be non-NULL. However, it is possible
* that an application erroneously cleared the callback between the time
* we sent the ClientHello and now. */
if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
PORT_Assert(0);
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK);
return SECFailure;
}
return ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ex_type, data);
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 list_len;
SECItem protocol_name;
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* The extension data from the server has the following format:
* uint16 name_list_len;
* uint8 len; // where len >= 1
* uint8 protocol_name[len]; */
if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &list_len, 2, &data->data,
&data->len);
/* The list has to be the entire extension. */
if (rv != SECSuccess || list_len != data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &protocol_name, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
/* The list must have exactly one value. */
if (rv != SECSuccess || data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE);
xtnData->nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &protocol_name);
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
/* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) {
return 0;
}
extension_length = 4;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn;
}
return extension_length;
loser:
return -1;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
/* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) {
return 0;
}
extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ +
2 /* protocol name list length */ +
ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
return 0;
}
if (append) {
/* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
* list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So we
* allocate a buffer and move the first protocol to the end of the
* list. */
SECStatus rv;
const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
alpn_protos = PORT_Alloc(len);
if (alpn_protos == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (len > 0) {
/* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */
unsigned int i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1;
if (i <= len) {
memcpy(alpn_protos, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i);
memcpy(alpn_protos + len - i, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i);
} else {
/* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */
memcpy(alpn_protos, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
}
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, alpn_protos, len, 2);
PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
alpn_protos = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn;
}
return extension_length;
loser:
if (alpn_protos) {
PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
}
return -1;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
/* we're in over our heads if any of these fail */
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableALPN);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.data);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.len > 0);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED);
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ +
2 /* protocol name list */ + 1 /* name length */ +
xtnData->nextProto.len;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, xtnData->nextProto.len + 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, xtnData->nextProto.data,
xtnData->nextProto.len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
}
return extension_length;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
ssl3HelloExtensionSenderFunc sender;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
/* remember that we got this extension. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
sender = tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn;
} else {
sender = ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn;
}
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ex_type, sender);
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(
const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
SECStatus rv;
if (!serverCert->certStatusArray ||
!serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
return 0;
}
extension_length = 2 + 2;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
return 0;
}
if (append) {
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* length of extension_data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* The certificate status data is sent in ssl3_SendCertificateStatus. */
}
return extension_length;
}
/* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the
* client side. See RFC 6066 section 8. */
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling)
return 0;
/* extension_type (2-bytes) +
* length(extension_data) (2-bytes) +
* status_type (1) +
* responder_id_list length (2) +
* request_extensions length (2)
*/
extension_length = 9;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are
* implicitly known to the server. */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions.
* Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This
* means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn;
}
return extension_length;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
/* In TLS 1.3, the extension carries the OCSP response. */
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss),
data->data, data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* code already set */
}
} else if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Called from ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket, tls13_SendNewSessionTicket
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss,
const NewSessionTicket *ticket,
SECItem *ticket_data)
{
PRUint32 i;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem plaintext;
SECItem plaintext_item = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem ciphertext = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRUint32 ciphertext_length;
SECItem ticket_buf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem ticket_tmp = { 0, NULL, 0 };
SECItem macParam = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRBool ms_is_wrapped;
unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH];
SECItem ms_item = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRUint32 padding_length;
PRUint32 ticket_length;
PRUint32 cert_length = 0;
PRUint8 length_buf[4];
PRUint32 now;
PK11SymKey *aes_key = NULL;
PK11SymKey *mac_key = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
PK11Context *aes_ctx;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
PK11Context *hmac_ctx = NULL;
unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int computed_mac_length;
unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
SECItem ivItem;
SECItem *srvName = NULL;
PRUint32 srvNameLen = 0;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value,
* must be >= 0 */
ssl3CipherSpec *spec;
const sslServerCertType *certType;
SECItem alpnSelection = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
cert_length = 3 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len;
}
/* Get IV and encryption keys */
ivItem.data = iv;
ivItem.len = sizeof(iv);
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(ss, &aes_key, &mac_key);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
} else {
spec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
}
if (spec->msItem.len && spec->msItem.data) {
/* The master secret is available unwrapped. */
ms_item.data = spec->msItem.data;
ms_item.len = spec->msItem.len;
ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE;
} else {
/* Extract the master secret wrapped. */
sslSessionID sid;
PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID));
rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, &sid, spec,
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms))
goto loser;
memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len);
ms_item.data = wrapped_ms;
ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech;
} else {
/* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */
goto loser;
}
ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE;
}
/* Prep to send negotiated name */
srvName = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
if (srvName->data && srvName->len) {
srvNameLen = 2 + srvName->len; /* len bytes + name len */
}
if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT &&
ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) {
alpnSelection = ss->xtnData.nextProto;
}
ciphertext_length =
sizeof(PRUint16) /* ticket_version */
+ sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) /* ssl_version */
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) /* ciphersuite */
+ 1 /* compression */
+ 10 /* cipher spec parameters */
+ 1 /* certType arguments */
+ 1 /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */
+ 4 /* msWrapMech */
+ 2 /* master_secret.length */
+ ms_item.len /* master_secret */
+ 1 /* client_auth_type */
+ cert_length /* cert */
+ 1 /* server name type */
+ srvNameLen /* name len + length field */
+ 1 /* extendedMasterSecretUsed */
+ sizeof(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint) /* ticket lifetime hint */
+ sizeof(ticket->flags) /* ticket flags */
+ 1 + alpnSelection.len; /* npn value + length field. */
padding_length = AES_BLOCK_SIZE -
(ciphertext_length %
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
ciphertext_length += padding_length;
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, ciphertext_length) == NULL)
goto loser;
plaintext = plaintext_item;
/* ticket_version */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION,
sizeof(PRUint16));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* ssl_version */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version,
sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* ciphersuite */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite,
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* compression */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* cipher spec parameters */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authType, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* certificate type */
certType = &ss->sec.serverCert->certType;
PORT_Assert(certType->authType == ss->sec.authType);
switch (ss->sec.authType) {
case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa:
PORT_Assert(certType->namedCurve);
PORT_Assert(certType->namedCurve->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh);
/* EC curves only use the second of the two bytes. */
PORT_Assert(certType->namedCurve->name < 256);
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext,
certType->namedCurve->name, 1);
break;
default:
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
break;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* master_secret */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* client_identity */
if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
/* timestamp */
now = ssl_Time();
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now,
sizeof(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (srvNameLen) {
/* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->type, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* HostName (length and value) */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
} else {
/* No Name */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, (char)TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
/* extendedMasterSecretUsed */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(
&plaintext, ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Flags */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ticket->flags,
sizeof(ticket->flags));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* NPN value. */
PORT_Assert(alpnSelection.len < 256);
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, alpnSelection.len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (alpnSelection.len) {
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, alpnSelection.data, alpnSelection.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == padding_length);
for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++)
plaintext.data[i] = (unsigned char)padding_length;
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ciphertext, ciphertext_length) == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
/* Generate encrypted portion of ticket. */
PORT_Assert(aes_key);
aes_ctx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_ENCRYPT, aes_key, &ivItem);
if (!aes_ctx)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx, ciphertext.data,
(int *)&ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len,
plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len);
PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx);
PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Convert ciphertext length to network order. */
length_buf[0] = (ciphertext.len >> 8) & 0xff;
length_buf[1] = (ciphertext.len) & 0xff;
/* Compute MAC. */
PORT_Assert(mac_key);
hmac_ctx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, CKA_SIGN, mac_key, &macParam);
if (!hmac_ctx)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx, computed_mac,
&computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
ticket_length =
+SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN /* key_name */
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE /* iv */
+ 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket.encrypted_state */
+ ciphertext_length /* encrypted_state */
+ TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH; /* mac */
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ticket_buf, ticket_length) == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
ticket_tmp = ticket_buf; /* Shallow copy because AppendToItem is
* destructive. */
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&ticket_tmp, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&ticket_tmp, iv, sizeof(iv));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&ticket_tmp, ciphertext.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&ticket_tmp, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&ticket_tmp, computed_mac, computed_mac_length);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Give ownership of memory to caller. */
*ticket_data = ticket_buf;
ticket_buf.data = NULL;
loser:
if (hmac_ctx) {
PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx, PR_TRUE);
}
if (plaintext_item.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE);
}
if (ciphertext.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ciphertext, PR_FALSE);
}
if (ticket_buf.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_buf, PR_FALSE);
}
return rv;
}
/* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket
* message is expected during the handshake.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
if (data->len != 0) {
return SECSuccess; /* Ignore the extension. */
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Generic ticket processing code, common to TLS 1.0-1.2 and
* TLS 1.3. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem *decrypted_state = NULL;
SessionTicket *parsed_session_ticket = NULL;
sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats;
PRUint32 i;
SECItem extension_data;
EncryptedSessionTicket enc_session_ticket;
unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int computed_mac_length;
PK11SymKey *aes_key = NULL;
PK11SymKey *mac_key = NULL;
PK11Context *hmac_ctx;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
PK11Context *aes_ctx;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
unsigned char *padding;
PRUint32 padding_length;
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int buffer_len;
PRUint32 temp;
SECItem cert_item;
PRUint32 nameType;
SECItem macParam = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem alpn_item;
SECItem ivItem;
/* Turn off stateless session resumption if the client sends a
* SessionTicket extension, even if the extension turns out to be
* malformed (ss->sec.ci.sid is non-NULL when doing session
* renegotiation.)
*/
if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
}
extension_data.data = data->data; /* Keep a copy for future use. */
extension_data.len = data->len;
if (ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(ss, data, &enc_session_ticket) !=
SECSuccess) {
return SECSuccess; /* Pretend it isn't there */
}
/* Get session ticket keys. */
rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(ss, &aes_key, &mac_key);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate session ticket keys.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto loser;
}
/* If the ticket sent by the client was generated under a key different
* from the one we have, bypass ticket processing.
*/
if (PORT_Memcmp(enc_session_ticket.key_name, key_name,
SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket key_name sent mismatch.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto no_ticket;
}
/* Verify the MAC on the ticket. MAC verification may also
* fail if the MAC key has been recently refreshed.
*/
PORT_Assert(mac_key);
hmac_ctx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, CKA_SIGN, mac_key, &macParam);
if (!hmac_ctx) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create HMAC context: %d.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
goto no_ticket;
} else {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Successfully created HMAC context.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
}
rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx, PR_TRUE);
goto no_ticket;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx, extension_data.data,
extension_data.len -
TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx, PR_TRUE);
goto no_ticket;
}
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx, computed_mac,
&computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed_mac, enc_session_ticket.mac,
computed_mac_length) !=
0) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket MAC mismatch.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto no_ticket;
}
/* We ignore key_name for now.
* This is ok as MAC verification succeeded.
*/
/* Decrypt the ticket. */
/* Plaintext is shorter than the ciphertext due to padding. */
decrypted_state = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL,
enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
PORT_Assert(aes_key);
ivItem.data = enc_session_ticket.iv;
ivItem.len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
aes_ctx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_DECRYPT,
aes_key, &ivItem);
if (!aes_ctx) {
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto no_ticket;
}
rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx, decrypted_state->data,
(int *)&decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len,
enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data,
enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx);
PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
/* Check padding. */
padding_length =
(PRUint32)decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - 1];
if (padding_length == 0 || padding_length > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
goto no_ticket;
padding = &decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - padding_length];
for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++, padding++) {
if (padding_length != (PRUint32)*padding)
goto no_ticket;
}
/* Deserialize session state. */
buffer = decrypted_state->data;
buffer_len = decrypted_state->len;
parsed_session_ticket = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SessionTicket));
if (parsed_session_ticket == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
/* Read ticket_version and reject if the version is wrong */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || temp != TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->ticket_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
/* Read SSLVersion. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
/* Read cipher_suite. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;
/* Read compression_method. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->compression_method = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;
/* Read cipher spec parameters. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->authType = (SSLAuthType)temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits = temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits = temp;
/* Read certificate slot */
parsed_session_ticket->certType.authType = parsed_session_ticket->authType;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
switch (parsed_session_ticket->authType) {
case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa:
case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: {
const sslNamedGroupDef *group =
ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)temp);
if (!group || group->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
goto no_ticket;
}
parsed_session_ticket->certType.namedCurve = group;
} break;
default:
break;
}
/* Read wrapped master_secret. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped = (PRBool)temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp;
if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length == 0 || /* sanity check MS. */
parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
sizeof(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret))
goto no_ticket;
/* Allow for the wrapped master secret to be longer. */
if (buffer_len < parsed_session_ticket->ms_length)
goto no_ticket;
PORT_Memcpy(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, buffer,
parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
buffer += parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
buffer_len -= parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
/* Read client_identity */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type =
(ClientAuthenticationType)temp;
switch (parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type) {
case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS:
break;
case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE:
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_item, 3,
&buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert,
&cert_item);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
break;
default:
goto no_ticket;
}
/* Read timestamp. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->timestamp = temp;
/* Read server name */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &nameType, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
if ((PRInt8)nameType != TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME) {
SECItem name_item;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &name_item, 2, &buffer,
&buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->srvName,
&name_item);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->srvName.type = (PRUint8)nameType;
}
/* Read extendedMasterSecretUsed */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
PORT_Assert(temp == PR_TRUE || temp == PR_FALSE);
parsed_session_ticket->extendedMasterSecretUsed = (PRBool)temp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &parsed_session_ticket->flags, 4,
&buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
parsed_session_ticket->flags = PR_ntohl(parsed_session_ticket->flags);
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &alpn_item, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
if (alpn_item.len != 0) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection,
&alpn_item);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
if (alpn_item.len >= 256)
goto no_ticket;
}
/* Done parsing. Check that all bytes have been consumed. */
if (buffer_len != padding_length)
goto no_ticket;
/* Use the ticket if it has not expired, otherwise free the allocated
* memory since the ticket is of no use.
*/
if (parsed_session_ticket->timestamp != 0 &&
parsed_session_ticket->timestamp +
TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT >
ssl_Time()) {
sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
if (sid == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
/* Copy over parameters. */
sid->version = parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version;
sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite;
sid->u.ssl3.compression = parsed_session_ticket->compression_method;
sid->authType = parsed_session_ticket->authType;
sid->authKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits;
sid->keaType = parsed_session_ticket->keaType;
sid->keaKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits;
memcpy(&sid->certType, &parsed_session_ticket->certType,
sizeof(sslServerCertType));
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket,
&extension_data) != SECSuccess)
goto no_ticket;
sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags = parsed_session_ticket->flags;
if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret))
goto no_ticket;
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
parsed_session_ticket->master_secret,
parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech;
sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped =
parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped;
sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = parsed_session_ticket->extendedMasterSecretUsed;
/* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */
if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data != NULL) {
if (sid->peerCert != NULL)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert);
sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle,
&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
if (sid->peerCert == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
}
if (parsed_session_ticket->srvName.data != NULL) {
if (sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE);
}
sid->u.ssl3.srvName = parsed_session_ticket->srvName;
}
if (parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection.data != NULL) {
sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection = parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection;
/* So we don't free below. */
parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection.data = NULL;
}
ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE;
ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
}
if (0) {
no_ticket:
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics();
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures);
}
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
/* ss->sec.ci.sid == sid if it did NOT come here via goto statement
* in that case do not free sid
*/
if (sid && (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid)) {
ssl_FreeSID(sid);
sid = NULL;
}
if (decrypted_state != NULL) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(decrypted_state, PR_TRUE);
decrypted_state = NULL;
}
if (parsed_session_ticket != NULL) {
if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, PR_FALSE);
}
if (parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->alpnSelection, PR_FALSE);
}
PORT_ZFree(parsed_session_ticket, sizeof(SessionTicket));
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
/* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* If we are doing TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
/* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client. We are
* lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake
* instead of terminating the current connection.
*/
if (data->len == 0) {
xtnData->emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
return ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), data);
}
/*
* Read bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure
* cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function
* on a shallow copy of the structure.
*/
static SECStatus
ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes)
{
if (bytes > item->len)
return SECFailure;
*buf = item->data;
item->data += bytes;
item->len -= bytes;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Extension format:
* Extension number: 2 bytes
* Extension length: 2 bytes
* Verify Data Length: 1 byte
* Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server)
* Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server)
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(
const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 len = 0;
PRInt32 needed;
/* In draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send
* both the SCSV and the empty RI, so when we send SCSV in
* the initial handshake, we don't also send RI.
*/
if (!ss || ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV)
return 0;
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2
: ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes;
}
needed = 5 + len;
if (maxBytes < (PRUint32)needed) {
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* length of extension_data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
}
}
return needed;
}
/* This function runs in both the client and server. */
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRUint32 len = 0;
if (ss->firstHsDone) {
len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes
: ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2;
}
if (data->len != 1 + len || data->data[0] != len) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
if (len && NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data,
data->data + 1, len)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */
CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)
->peerRequestedProtection = 1;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
/* prepare to send back the appropriate response */
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ex_type,
ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn);
}
return rv;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRUint32 ext_data_len;
PRInt16 i;
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss)
return 0;
if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount)
return 0; /* Not relevant */
ext_data_len = 2 + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount + 1;
if (append && maxBytes >= 4 + ext_data_len) {
/* Extension type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Length of extension data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ext_data_len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount,
2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* The SRTP ciphers */
for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i],
2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
}
/* Empty MKI value */
ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
}
return 4 + ext_data_len;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* Server side */
if (!append || maxBytes < 9) {
return 9;
}
/* Extension type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Length of extension data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 5, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* The selected cipher */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return -1;
/* Empty MKI value */
ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
return 9;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem ciphers = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
PRUint16 i;
PRUint16 cipher = 0;
PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
SECItem litem;
if (!data->data || !data->len) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Get the cipher list */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* fatal alert already sent */
}
/* Now check that the server has picked just 1 (i.e., len = 2) */
if (ciphers.len != 2) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Get the selected cipher */
cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1];
/* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */
for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Get the srtp_mki value */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */
}
/* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */
if (litem.len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* extra trailing bytes */
if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* OK, this looks fine. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem ciphers = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
PRUint16 i;
unsigned int j;
PRUint16 cipher = 0;
PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
SECItem litem;
if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) {
/* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP
* preferences have been set. */
return SECSuccess;
}
if (!data->data || data->len < 5) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Get the cipher list */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */
}
/* Check that the list is even length */
if (ciphers.len % 2) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our
* ciphers, if any */
for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) {
cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1];
if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
/* Get the srtp_mki value */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); /* trailing bytes */
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now figure out what to do */
if (!found) {
/* No matching ciphers, pretend we don't support use_srtp */
return SECSuccess;
}
/* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */
xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData,
ssl_use_srtp_xtn,
ssl3_ServerSendUseSRTPXtn);
}
/* ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension
* from a client.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (xtnData->clientSigSchemes) {
PORT_Free(xtnData->clientSigSchemes);
xtnData->clientSigSchemes = NULL;
}
rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, NULL,
&xtnData->clientSigSchemes,
&xtnData->numClientSigScheme,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Check for trailing data. */
if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS
* 1.2 ClientHellos. */
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
PRUint8 buf[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2];
PRUint32 len;
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
return 0;
}
rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, buf, sizeof(buf), &len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
extension_length =
2 /* extension type */ +
2 /* extension length */ +
2 /* supported_signature_algorithms length */ +
len;
if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 2, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf, len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn;
}
return extension_length;
}
/* Takes the size of the ClientHello, less the record header, and determines how
* much padding is required. */
unsigned int
ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(unsigned int clientHelloLength)
{
unsigned int recordLength = 1 /* handshake message type */ +
3 /* handshake message length */ +
clientHelloLength;
unsigned int extensionLength;
if (recordLength < 256 || recordLength >= 512) {
return 0;
}
extensionLength = 512 - recordLength;
/* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
* one byte of data if including the extension. Some servers (e.g.
* WebSphere Application Server 7.0 and Tomcat) will time out or terminate
* the connection if the last extension in the client hello is empty. */
if (extensionLength < 4 + 1) {
extensionLength = 4 + 1;
}
return extensionLength;
}
/* ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension possibly adds an extension which ensures that a
* ClientHello record is either < 256 bytes or is >= 512 bytes. This ensures
* that we don't trigger bugs in F5 products. */
PRInt32
ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int extensionLen,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
unsigned int paddingLen = extensionLen - 4;
static unsigned char padding[252];
if (extensionLen == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (extensionLen > maxBytes ||
!paddingLen ||
paddingLen > sizeof(padding)) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return -1;
}
if (SECSuccess != ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_padding_xtn, 2))
return -1;
if (SECSuccess != ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, paddingLen, 2))
return -1;
return extensionLen;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_SendExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
if (!ss->opt.enableExtendedMS) {
return 0;
}
/* Always send the extension in this function, since the
* client always sends it and this function is only called on
* the server if we negotiated the extension. */
extension_length = 4; /* Type + length (0) */
if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn;
}
return extension_length;
loser:
return -1;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (!ss->opt.enableExtendedMS) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (data->len != 0) {
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Bogus extended master secret extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return SECFailure;
}
SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Negotiated extended master secret extension.",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(
ss, xtnData, ex_type, ssl3_SendExtendedMasterSecretXtn);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn sends the signed_certificate_timestamp
* extension for TLS ClientHellos. */
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length = 2 /* extension_type */ +
2 /* length(extension_data) */;
/* Only send the extension if processing is enabled. */
if (!ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps)
return 0;
if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
SECStatus rv;
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn,
2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* zero length */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn;
} else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
return extension_length;
loser:
return -1;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
/* We do not yet know whether we'll be resuming a session or creating
* a new one, so we keep a pointer to the data in the TLSExtensionData
* structure. This pointer is only valid in the scope of
* ssl3_HandleServerHello, and, if not resuming a session, the data is
* copied once a new session structure has been set up.
* All parsing is currently left to the application and we accept
* everything, including empty data.
*/
SECItem *scts = &xtnData->signedCertTimestamps;
PORT_Assert(!scts->data && !scts->len);
if (!data->len) {
/* Empty extension data: RFC 6962 mandates non-empty contents. */
return SECFailure;
}
*scts = *data;
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECSuccess;
}
PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRBool append,
PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
PRInt32 extension_length;
const SECItem *scts = &ss->sec.serverCert->signedCertTimestamps;
if (!scts->len) {
/* No timestamps to send */
return 0;
}
extension_length = 2 /* extension_type */ +
2 /* length(extension_data) */ +
scts->len;
if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (append) {
SECStatus rv;
/* extension_type */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn,
2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
/* extension_data */
rv = ssl3_ExtAppendHandshakeVariable(ss, scts->data, scts->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return -1;
}
}
return extension_length;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(
ss, xtnData, ex_type, ssl3_ServerSendSignedCertTimestampXtn);
}
/* Just make sure that the remote client supports uncompressed points,
* Since that is all we support. Disable ECC cipher suites if it doesn't.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRUint16 ex_type,
SECItem *data)
{
int i;
if (data->len < 2 || data->len > 255 || !data->data ||
data->len != (unsigned int)data->data[0] + 1) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
for (i = data->len; --i > 0;) {
if (data->data[i] == 0) {
/* indicate that we should send a reply */
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ex_type,
&ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn);
return rv;
}
}
/* Poor client doesn't support uncompressed points. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE);
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus
ssl_UpdateSupportedGroups(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 list_len;
unsigned int i;
const sslNamedGroupDef *enabled[SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT] = { 0 };
PORT_Assert(SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(enabled));
if (!data->data || data->len < 4) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* get the length of elliptic_curve_list */
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &list_len, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || data->len != list_len || (data->len % 2) != 0) {
(void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
/* disable all groups and remember the enabled groups */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
enabled[i] = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i];
ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL;
}
/* Read groups from data and enable if in |enabled| */
while (data->len) {
const sslNamedGroupDef *group;
PRUint32 curve_name;
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &curve_name, 2, &data->data,
&data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* fatal alert already sent */
}
group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(curve_name);
if (group) {
for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
if (enabled[i] && group == enabled[i]) {
ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = enabled[i];
break;
}
}
}
/* "Codepoints in the NamedCurve registry with a high byte of 0x01 (that
* is, between 256 and 511 inclusive) are set aside for FFDHE groups,"
* -- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10
*/
if ((curve_name & 0xff00) == 0x0100) {
ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups = PR_TRUE;
}
}
/* Note: if ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups is set, we disable DHE cipher
* suites, but we do that in ssl3_config_match(). */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 &&
!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) {
/* If we don't require that DHE use named groups, and no FFDHE was
* included, we pretend that they support all the FFDHE groups we do. */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
if (enabled[i] && enabled[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_dh) {
ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = enabled[i];
}
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Ensure that the curve in our server cert is one of the ones supported
* by the remote client, and disable all ECC cipher suites if not.
*/
SECStatus
ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl_UpdateSupportedGroups(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), data);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
/* TLS 1.3 permits the server to send this extension so make it so. */
if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ex_type,
&ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* error already set. */
}
}
/* Remember that we negotiated this extension. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
return SECSuccess;
}
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