forked from mirrors/gecko-dev
af3b11c151
As our threattype-listname conversion design, "goog-harmful-proto" is allocated for this new threat type. This threat type is mainly for mobile. MozReview-Commit-ID: G9GbgmHHHfp --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 0681fcd9322b94451a86eafe57bf1ccc4b89db30 extra : intermediate-source : 28b0502d9add81beeae58a2c33f9fd5839d4d544 extra : source : 646f02f15131aa98ad37015b0a641304a3271796
806 lines
23 KiB
C++
806 lines
23 KiB
C++
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsEscape.h"
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#include "nsString.h"
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#include "nsIURI.h"
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#include "nsUrlClassifierUtils.h"
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#include "nsTArray.h"
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#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
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#include "plbase64.h"
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#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
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#include "safebrowsing.pb.h"
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#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
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#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
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#define DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION "2.2"
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static char int_to_hex_digit(int32_t i)
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{
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NS_ASSERTION((i >= 0) && (i <= 15), "int too big in int_to_hex_digit");
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return static_cast<char>(((i < 10) ? (i + '0') : ((i - 10) + 'A')));
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}
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static bool
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IsDecimal(const nsACString & num)
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{
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num.Length(); i++) {
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if (!isdigit(num[i])) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool
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IsHex(const nsACString & num)
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{
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if (num.Length() < 3) {
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return false;
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}
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if (num[0] != '0' || !(num[1] == 'x' || num[1] == 'X')) {
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return false;
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}
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for (uint32_t i = 2; i < num.Length(); i++) {
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if (!isxdigit(num[i])) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool
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IsOctal(const nsACString & num)
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{
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if (num.Length() < 2) {
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return false;
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}
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if (num[0] != '0') {
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return false;
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}
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for (uint32_t i = 1; i < num.Length(); i++) {
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if (!isdigit(num[i]) || num[i] == '8' || num[i] == '9') {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// SafeBrowsing V4 related utits.
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace safebrowsing {
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static PlatformType
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GetPlatformType()
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{
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#if defined(ANDROID)
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return ANDROID_PLATFORM;
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#elif defined(XP_MACOSX)
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return OSX_PLATFORM;
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#elif defined(XP_LINUX)
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return LINUX_PLATFORM;
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#elif defined(XP_WIN)
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return WINDOWS_PLATFORM;
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#else
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// Default to Linux for other platforms (see bug 1362501).
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return LINUX_PLATFORM;
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#endif
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}
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typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest ListUpdateRequest;
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typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest_Constraints Constraints;
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static void
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InitListUpdateRequest(ThreatType aThreatType,
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const char* aStateBase64,
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ListUpdateRequest* aListUpdateRequest)
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{
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aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_type(aThreatType);
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aListUpdateRequest->set_platform_type(GetPlatformType());
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aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_entry_type(URL);
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Constraints* contraints = new Constraints();
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contraints->add_supported_compressions(RICE);
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aListUpdateRequest->set_allocated_constraints(contraints);
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// Only set non-empty state.
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if (aStateBase64[0] != '\0') {
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nsCString stateBinary;
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nsresult rv = Base64Decode(nsDependentCString(aStateBase64), stateBinary);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
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aListUpdateRequest->set_state(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length());
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}
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}
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}
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static ClientInfo*
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CreateClientInfo()
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{
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ClientInfo* c = new ClientInfo();
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch =
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do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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nsXPIDLCString clientId;
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nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref("browser.safebrowsing.id",
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getter_Copies(clientId));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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clientId = "Firefox"; // Use "Firefox" as fallback.
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}
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c->set_client_id(clientId.get());
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return c;
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}
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} // end of namespace safebrowsing.
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} // end of namespace mozilla.
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::nsUrlClassifierUtils()
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: mProviderDictLock("nsUrlClassifierUtils.mProviderDictLock")
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{
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}
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nsresult
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::Init()
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{
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// nsIUrlClassifierUtils is a thread-safe service so it's
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// allowed to use on non-main threads. However, building
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// the provider dictionary must be on the main thread.
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// We forcefully load nsUrlClassifierUtils in
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// nsUrlClassifierDBService::Init() to ensure we must
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// now be on the main thread.
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nsresult rv = ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Add an observer for shutdown
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nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
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mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
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if (!observerService)
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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observerService->AddObserver(this, "xpcom-shutdown-threads", false);
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Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this, "browser.safebrowsing");
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsUrlClassifierUtils,
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nsIUrlClassifierUtils,
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nsIObserver)
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// nsIUrlClassifierUtils
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetKeyForURI(nsIURI * uri, nsACString & _retval)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(uri);
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if (!innerURI)
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innerURI = uri;
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nsAutoCString host;
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innerURI->GetAsciiHost(host);
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if (host.IsEmpty()) {
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return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
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}
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nsresult rv = CanonicalizeHostname(host, _retval);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsAutoCString path;
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rv = innerURI->GetPathQueryRef(path);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// strip out anchors
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int32_t ref = path.FindChar('#');
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if (ref != kNotFound)
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path.SetLength(ref);
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nsAutoCString temp;
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rv = CanonicalizePath(path, temp);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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_retval.Append(temp);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// We use "goog-*-proto" as the list name for v4, where "proto" indicates
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// it's updated (as well as hash completion) via protobuf.
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//
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// In the mozilla official build, we are allowed to use the
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// private phishing list (goog-phish-proto). See Bug 1288840.
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static const struct {
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const char* mListName;
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uint32_t mThreatType;
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} THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[] = {
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{ "goog-malware-proto", MALWARE_THREAT}, // 1
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{ "googpub-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2
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{ "goog-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3
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{ "goog-harmful-proto", POTENTIALLY_HARMFUL_APPLICATION}, // 4
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{ "goog-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING}, // 5
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// For application reputation
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{ "goog-badbinurl-proto", MALICIOUS_BINARY}, // 7
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{ "goog-downloadwhite-proto", CSD_DOWNLOAD_WHITELIST}, // 9
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// For testing purpose.
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{ "test-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC}, // 2
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{ "test-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE}, // 3
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};
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(uint32_t aThreatType,
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nsACString& aListNames)
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{
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
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if (aThreatType == THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType) {
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if (!aListNames.IsEmpty()) {
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aListNames.AppendLiteral(",");
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}
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aListNames += THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName;
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}
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}
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return aListNames.IsEmpty() ? NS_ERROR_FAILURE : NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertListNameToThreatType(const nsACString& aListName,
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uint32_t* aThreatType)
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{
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
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if (aListName.EqualsASCII(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName)) {
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*aThreatType = THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProvider(const nsACString& aTableName,
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nsACString& aProvider)
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{
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MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
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nsCString* provider = nullptr;
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if (StringBeginsWith(aTableName, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("test"))) {
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aProvider = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(TESTING_TABLE_PROVIDER_NAME);
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} else if (mProviderDict.Get(aTableName, &provider)) {
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aProvider = provider ? *provider : EmptyCString();
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} else {
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aProvider = EmptyCString();
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetTelemetryProvider(const nsACString& aTableName,
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nsACString& aProvider)
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{
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GetProvider(aTableName, aProvider);
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// Whitelist known providers to avoid reporting on private ones.
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// An empty provider is treated as "other"
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if (!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("mozilla").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("google").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("google4").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("baidu").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("mozcn").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("yandex").Equals(aProvider) &&
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!NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(TESTING_TABLE_PROVIDER_NAME).Equals(aProvider)) {
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aProvider.Assign(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("other"));
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProtocolVersion(const nsACString& aProvider,
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nsACString& aVersion)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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if (prefBranch) {
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nsPrintfCString prefName("browser.safebrowsing.provider.%s.pver",
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nsCString(aProvider).get());
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nsXPIDLCString version;
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nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(prefName.get(), getter_Copies(version));
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aVersion = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) ? version : DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
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} else {
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aVersion = DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeUpdateRequestV4(const char** aListNames,
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const char** aStatesBase64,
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uint32_t aCount,
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nsACString &aRequest)
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{
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using namespace mozilla::safebrowsing;
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FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest r;
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r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo());
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aCount; i++) {
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nsCString listName(aListNames[i]);
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uint32_t threatType;
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nsresult rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(listName, &threatType);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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continue; // Unknown list name.
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}
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auto lur = r.mutable_list_update_requests()->Add();
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InitListUpdateRequest(static_cast<ThreatType>(threatType), aStatesBase64[i], lur);
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}
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// Then serialize.
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std::string s;
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r.SerializeToString(&s);
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nsCString out;
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nsresult rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(),
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(const uint8_t*)s.c_str(),
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Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include,
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out);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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aRequest = out;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeFindFullHashRequestV4(const char** aListNames,
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const char** aListStatesBase64,
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const char** aPrefixesBase64,
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uint32_t aListCount,
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uint32_t aPrefixCount,
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nsACString &aRequest)
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{
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FindFullHashesRequest r;
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r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo());
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nsresult rv;
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// Set up FindFullHashesRequest.client_states.
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aListCount; i++) {
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nsCString stateBinary;
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rv = Base64Decode(nsDependentCString(aListStatesBase64[i]), stateBinary);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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r.add_client_states(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length());
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}
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//-------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Set up FindFullHashesRequest.threat_info.
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auto threatInfo = r.mutable_threat_info();
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// 1) Set threat types.
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aListCount; i++) {
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uint32_t threatType;
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rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(nsDependentCString(aListNames[i]), &threatType);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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threatInfo->add_threat_types((ThreatType)threatType);
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}
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// 2) Set platform type.
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threatInfo->add_platform_types(GetPlatformType());
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// 3) Set threat entry type.
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threatInfo->add_threat_entry_types(URL);
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// 4) Set threat entries.
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aPrefixCount; i++) {
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nsCString prefixBinary;
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rv = Base64Decode(nsDependentCString(aPrefixesBase64[i]), prefixBinary);
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threatInfo->add_threat_entries()->set_hash(prefixBinary.get(),
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prefixBinary.Length());
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}
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//-------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Then serialize.
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std::string s;
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r.SerializeToString(&s);
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nsCString out;
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rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(),
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(const uint8_t*)s.c_str(),
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Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include,
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out);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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aRequest = out;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static uint32_t
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DurationToMs(const Duration& aDuration)
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{
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// Seconds precision is good enough. Ignore nanoseconds like Chrome does.
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return aDuration.seconds() * 1000;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseFindFullHashResponseV4(const nsACString& aResponse,
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nsIUrlClassifierParseFindFullHashCallback *aCallback)
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{
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enum CompletionErrorType {
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SUCCESS = 0,
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PARSING_FAILURE = 1,
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UNKNOWN_THREAT_TYPE = 2,
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};
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FindFullHashesResponse r;
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if (!r.ParseFromArray(aResponse.BeginReading(), aResponse.Length())) {
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NS_WARNING("Invalid response");
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_COMPLETION_ERROR,
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PARSING_FAILURE);
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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bool hasUnknownThreatType = false;
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for (auto& m : r.matches()) {
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nsCString tableNames;
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nsresult rv = ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(m.threat_type(), tableNames);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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hasUnknownThreatType = true;
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continue; // Ignore un-convertable threat type.
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}
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auto& hash = m.threat().hash();
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auto cacheDurationSec = m.cache_duration().seconds();
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aCallback->OnCompleteHashFound(nsDependentCString(hash.c_str(), hash.length()),
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tableNames, cacheDurationSec);
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_POSITIVE_CACHE_DURATION,
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cacheDurationSec * PR_MSEC_PER_SEC);
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}
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auto minWaitDuration = DurationToMs(r.minimum_wait_duration());
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auto negCacheDurationSec = r.negative_cache_duration().seconds();
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aCallback->OnResponseParsed(minWaitDuration, negCacheDurationSec);
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_COMPLETION_ERROR,
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hasUnknownThreatType ? UNKNOWN_THREAT_TYPE : SUCCESS);
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_NEGATIVE_CACHE_DURATION,
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negCacheDurationSec * PR_MSEC_PER_SEC);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// nsIObserver
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsUrlClassifierUtils::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic,
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const char16_t *aData)
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{
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if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID)) {
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MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
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return ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
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}
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if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, "xpcom-shutdown-threads")) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
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return prefs->RemoveObserver("browser.safebrowsing", this);
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}
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return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
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}
|
|
|
|
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
|
// non-interface methods
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::ReadProvidersFromPrefs(ProviderDictType& aDict)
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "ReadProvidersFromPrefs must be on main thread");
|
|
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch;
|
|
nsresult rv = prefs->GetBranch("browser.safebrowsing.provider.",
|
|
getter_AddRefs(prefBranch));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// We've got a pref branch for "browser.safebrowsing.provider.".
|
|
// Enumerate all children prefs and parse providers.
|
|
uint32_t childCount;
|
|
char** childArray;
|
|
rv = prefBranch->GetChildList("", &childCount, &childArray);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
// Collect providers from childArray.
|
|
nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> providers;
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < childCount; i++) {
|
|
nsCString child(childArray[i]);
|
|
auto dotPos = child.FindChar('.');
|
|
if (dotPos < 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsDependentCSubstring provider = Substring(child, 0, dotPos);
|
|
|
|
providers.PutEntry(provider);
|
|
}
|
|
NS_FREE_XPCOM_ALLOCATED_POINTER_ARRAY(childCount, childArray);
|
|
|
|
// Now we have all providers. Check which one owns |aTableName|.
|
|
// e.g. The owning lists of provider "google" is defined in
|
|
// "browser.safebrowsing.provider.google.lists".
|
|
for (auto itr = providers.Iter(); !itr.Done(); itr.Next()) {
|
|
auto entry = itr.Get();
|
|
nsCString provider(entry->GetKey());
|
|
nsPrintfCString owninListsPref("%s.lists", provider.get());
|
|
|
|
nsXPIDLCString owningLists;
|
|
nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(owninListsPref.get(),
|
|
getter_Copies(owningLists));
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We've got the owning lists (represented as string) of |provider|.
|
|
// Build the dictionary for the owning list and the current provider.
|
|
nsTArray<nsCString> tables;
|
|
Classifier::SplitTables(owningLists, tables);
|
|
for (auto tableName : tables) {
|
|
aDict.Put(tableName, new nsCString(provider));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizeHostname(const nsACString & hostname,
|
|
nsACString & _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
nsAutoCString unescaped;
|
|
if (!NS_UnescapeURL(PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(),
|
|
PromiseFlatCString(hostname).Length(),
|
|
0, unescaped)) {
|
|
unescaped.Assign(hostname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString cleaned;
|
|
CleanupHostname(unescaped, cleaned);
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString temp;
|
|
ParseIPAddress(cleaned, temp);
|
|
if (!temp.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
cleaned.Assign(temp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ToLowerCase(cleaned);
|
|
SpecialEncode(cleaned, false, _retval);
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
nsresult
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizePath(const nsACString & path,
|
|
nsACString & _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
_retval.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString decodedPath(path);
|
|
nsAutoCString temp;
|
|
while (NS_UnescapeURL(decodedPath.get(), decodedPath.Length(), 0, temp)) {
|
|
decodedPath.Assign(temp);
|
|
temp.Truncate();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SpecialEncode(decodedPath, true, _retval);
|
|
// XXX: lowercase the path?
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::CleanupHostname(const nsACString & hostname,
|
|
nsACString & _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
_retval.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
const char* curChar = hostname.BeginReading();
|
|
const char* end = hostname.EndReading();
|
|
char lastChar = '\0';
|
|
while (curChar != end) {
|
|
unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
|
|
if (c == '.' && (lastChar == '\0' || lastChar == '.')) {
|
|
// skip
|
|
} else {
|
|
_retval.Append(*curChar);
|
|
}
|
|
lastChar = c;
|
|
++curChar;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// cut off trailing dots
|
|
while (_retval.Length() > 0 && _retval[_retval.Length() - 1] == '.') {
|
|
_retval.SetLength(_retval.Length() - 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseIPAddress(const nsACString & host,
|
|
nsACString & _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
_retval.Truncate();
|
|
nsACString::const_iterator iter, end;
|
|
host.BeginReading(iter);
|
|
host.EndReading(end);
|
|
|
|
if (host.Length() <= 15) {
|
|
// The Windows resolver allows a 4-part dotted decimal IP address to
|
|
// have a space followed by any old rubbish, so long as the total length
|
|
// of the string doesn't get above 15 characters. So, "10.192.95.89 xy"
|
|
// is resolved to 10.192.95.89.
|
|
// If the string length is greater than 15 characters, e.g.
|
|
// "10.192.95.89 xy.wildcard.example.com", it will be resolved through
|
|
// DNS.
|
|
|
|
if (FindCharInReadable(' ', iter, end)) {
|
|
end = iter;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (host.BeginReading(iter); iter != end; iter++) {
|
|
if (!(isxdigit(*iter) || *iter == 'x' || *iter == 'X' || *iter == '.')) {
|
|
// not an IP
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
host.BeginReading(iter);
|
|
nsTArray<nsCString> parts;
|
|
ParseString(PromiseFlatCString(Substring(iter, end)), '.', parts);
|
|
if (parts.Length() > 4) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If any potentially-octal numbers (start with 0 but not hex) have
|
|
// non-octal digits, no part of the ip can be in octal
|
|
// XXX: this came from the old javascript implementation, is it really
|
|
// supposed to be like this?
|
|
bool allowOctal = true;
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
|
|
const nsCString& part = parts[i];
|
|
if (part[0] == '0') {
|
|
for (uint32_t j = 1; j < part.Length(); j++) {
|
|
if (part[j] == 'x') {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (part[j] == '8' || part[j] == '9') {
|
|
allowOctal = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
|
|
nsAutoCString canonical;
|
|
|
|
if (i == parts.Length() - 1) {
|
|
CanonicalNum(parts[i], 5 - parts.Length(), allowOctal, canonical);
|
|
} else {
|
|
CanonicalNum(parts[i], 1, allowOctal, canonical);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (canonical.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
_retval.Truncate();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
_retval.Assign(canonical);
|
|
} else {
|
|
_retval.Append('.');
|
|
_retval.Append(canonical);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalNum(const nsACString& num,
|
|
uint32_t bytes,
|
|
bool allowOctal,
|
|
nsACString& _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
_retval.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
if (num.Length() < 1) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t val;
|
|
if (allowOctal && IsOctal(num)) {
|
|
if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%o", &val) != 1) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (IsDecimal(num)) {
|
|
if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%u", &val) != 1) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (IsHex(num)) {
|
|
if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), num[1] == 'X' ? "0X%x" : "0x%x",
|
|
&val) != 1) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (bytes--) {
|
|
char buf[20];
|
|
SprintfLiteral(buf, "%u", val & 0xff);
|
|
if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
_retval.Assign(buf);
|
|
} else {
|
|
_retval = nsDependentCString(buf) + NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".") + _retval;
|
|
}
|
|
val >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This function will encode all "special" characters in typical url
|
|
// encoding, that is %hh where h is a valid hex digit. It will also fold
|
|
// any duplicated slashes.
|
|
bool
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::SpecialEncode(const nsACString & url,
|
|
bool foldSlashes,
|
|
nsACString & _retval)
|
|
{
|
|
bool changed = false;
|
|
const char* curChar = url.BeginReading();
|
|
const char* end = url.EndReading();
|
|
|
|
unsigned char lastChar = '\0';
|
|
while (curChar != end) {
|
|
unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
|
|
if (ShouldURLEscape(c)) {
|
|
_retval.Append('%');
|
|
_retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c / 16));
|
|
_retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c % 16));
|
|
|
|
changed = true;
|
|
} else if (foldSlashes && (c == '/' && lastChar == '/')) {
|
|
// skip
|
|
} else {
|
|
_retval.Append(*curChar);
|
|
}
|
|
lastChar = c;
|
|
curChar++;
|
|
}
|
|
return changed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsUrlClassifierUtils::ShouldURLEscape(const unsigned char c) const
|
|
{
|
|
return c <= 32 || c == '%' || c >=127;
|
|
}
|