forked from mirrors/linux
ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.
The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could
read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.
1 while (length > 0) {
2 int opcode = *ptr++;
3 int opsize;
4
5 switch (opcode) {
6 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7 return;
8 case TCPOPT_NOP: /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9 length--;
10 continue;
11 default:
12 opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access
If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.
Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is
larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net,
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length--;
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continue;
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default:
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if (length < 2)
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return;
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opsize = *ptr++;
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if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
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return;
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