forked from mirrors/linux
		
	ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.
The TCP option parsing routines in tcp_parse_options function could
read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.
1         while (length > 0) {
2                 int opcode = *ptr++;
3                 int opsize;
4
5                 switch (opcode) {
6                 case TCPOPT_EOL:
7                         return;
8                 case TCPOPT_NOP:        /* Ref: RFC 793 section 3.1 */
9                         length--;
10                        continue;
11                default:
12                        opsize = *ptr++; //out of bound access
If length = 1, then there is an access in line2.
And another access is occurred in line 12.
This would lead to out-of-bound access.
Therefore, in the patch we check that the available data length is
larger enough to pase both TCP option code and size.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
			
			
This commit is contained in:
		
							parent
							
								
									62851d71e7
								
							
						
					
					
						commit
						9609dad263
					
				
					 1 changed files with 2 additions and 0 deletions
				
			
		|  | @ -3791,6 +3791,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, | |||
| 			length--; | ||||
| 			continue; | ||||
| 		default: | ||||
| 			if (length < 2) | ||||
| 				return; | ||||
| 			opsize = *ptr++; | ||||
| 			if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */ | ||||
| 				return; | ||||
|  |  | |||
		Loading…
	
		Reference in a new issue
	
	 Young Xiao
						Young Xiao