forked from mirrors/linux
		
	bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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		|  | @ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { | ||||||
| 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, | 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, | ||||||
| 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE, | 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE, | ||||||
| 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, | 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, | ||||||
|  | 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ, | ||||||
| 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, | 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, | ||||||
| }; | }; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
|  |  | ||||||
|  | @ -139,8 +139,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr) | ||||||
| { | { | ||||||
| 	int ret; | 	int ret; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
|  | 	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ); | ||||||
|  | 	if (ret < 0) | ||||||
|  | 		goto out; | ||||||
|  | 
 | ||||||
| 	ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); | 	ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); | ||||||
| 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) | 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) | ||||||
|  | out: | ||||||
| 		memset(dst, 0, size); | 		memset(dst, 0, size); | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	return ret; | 	return ret; | ||||||
|  | @ -566,6 +571,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size, | ||||||
| { | { | ||||||
| 	int ret; | 	int ret; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
|  | 	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ); | ||||||
|  | 	if (ret < 0) | ||||||
|  | 		goto out; | ||||||
|  | 
 | ||||||
| 	/*
 | 	/*
 | ||||||
| 	 * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire | 	 * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire | ||||||
| 	 * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing | 	 * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing | ||||||
|  | @ -577,6 +586,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size, | ||||||
| 	 */ | 	 */ | ||||||
| 	ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); | 	ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); | ||||||
| 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) | 	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) | ||||||
|  | out: | ||||||
| 		memset(dst, 0, size); | 		memset(dst, 0, size); | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| 	return ret; | 	return ret; | ||||||
|  |  | ||||||
|  | @ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { | ||||||
| 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", | 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", | ||||||
| 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", | 	[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", | ||||||
| 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", | 	[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", | ||||||
|  | 	[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", | ||||||
| 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", | 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", | ||||||
| }; | }; | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
|  |  | ||||||
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	 David Howells
						David Howells