forked from mirrors/linux
		
	 9d6d7f1cb6
			
		
	
	
		9d6d7f1cb6
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			wait_for_unix_gc() reads unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress
without synchronization.
Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() and their associated comments
to better document the intent.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / wait_for_unix_gc
write to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9380 on cpu 0:
 unix_inflight+0x1e8/0x260 net/unix/scm.c:63
 unix_attach_fds+0x10c/0x1e0 net/unix/scm.c:121
 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1674 [inline]
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x679/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1817
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffffffff86e2b7c0 of 4 bytes by task 9375 on cpu 1:
 wait_for_unix_gc+0x24/0x160 net/unix/garbage.c:196
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x8e/0x16b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1772
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xcc/0x110 net/unix/af_unix.c:2258
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2463 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x267/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2549
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2575
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000002 -> 0x00000004
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 9375 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 9915672d41 ("af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114164328.2038499-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
		
	
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
			154 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			3.7 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			154 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			3.7 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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| #include <linux/module.h>
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| #include <linux/kernel.h>
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| #include <linux/string.h>
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| #include <linux/socket.h>
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| #include <linux/net.h>
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| #include <linux/fs.h>
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| #include <net/af_unix.h>
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| #include <net/scm.h>
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| #include <linux/init.h>
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| #include <linux/io_uring.h>
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| 
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| #include "scm.h"
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| 
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| unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_tot_inflight);
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| 
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| LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(gc_inflight_list);
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| 
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| DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_gc_lock);
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| 
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| struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
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| {
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| 	struct sock *u_sock = NULL;
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| 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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| 
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| 	/* Socket ? */
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| 	if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) && !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
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| 		struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
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| 		struct sock *s = sock->sk;
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| 
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| 		/* PF_UNIX ? */
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| 		if (s && sock->ops && sock->ops->family == PF_UNIX)
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| 			u_sock = s;
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| 	} else {
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| 		/* Could be an io_uring instance */
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| 		u_sock = io_uring_get_socket(filp);
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| 	}
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| 	return u_sock;
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_get_socket);
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| 
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| /* Keep the number of times in flight count for the file
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|  * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
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|  */
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| void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
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| {
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| 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
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| 
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| 	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
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| 
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| 	if (s) {
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| 		struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
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| 
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| 		if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
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| 			BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
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| 			list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
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| 		} else {
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| 			BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
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| 		}
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| 		/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */
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| 		WRITE_ONCE(unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight + 1);
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| 	}
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| 	user->unix_inflight++;
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| 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
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| }
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| 
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| void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
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| {
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| 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
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| 
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| 	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
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| 
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| 	if (s) {
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| 		struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
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| 
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| 		BUG_ON(!atomic_long_read(&u->inflight));
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| 		BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
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| 
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| 		if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
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| 			list_del_init(&u->link);
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| 		/* Paired with READ_ONCE() in wait_for_unix_gc() */
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| 		WRITE_ONCE(unix_tot_inflight, unix_tot_inflight - 1);
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| 	}
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| 	user->unix_inflight--;
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| 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
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|  * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
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|  * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
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|  * it across threads. Tough.
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|  */
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| static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
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| {
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| 	struct user_struct *user = current_user();
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| 
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| 	if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
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| 		return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
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| 	return false;
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| }
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| 
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| int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
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| {
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| 	int i;
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| 
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| 	if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
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| 		return -ETOOMANYREFS;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
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| 	 * collection.  Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
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| 	 * candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
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| 	 */
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| 	UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
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| 	if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
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| 		return -ENOMEM;
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| 
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| 	for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
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| 		unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_attach_fds);
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| 
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| void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
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| {
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| 	int i;
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| 
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| 	scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
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| 	UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
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| 
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| 	for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
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| 		unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_detach_fds);
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| 
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| void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
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| {
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| 	struct scm_cookie scm;
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| 
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| 	memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
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| 	scm.pid  = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
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| 	if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
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| 		unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
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| 
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| 	/* Alas, it calls VFS */
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| 	/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
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| 	scm_destroy(&scm);
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| 	sock_wfree(skb);
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unix_destruct_scm);
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