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	 a5eff72597
			
		
	
	
		a5eff72597
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			The task's initial PKRU value is set partly for fpu__clear()/ copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(). It is not part of init_fpstate.xsave and instead it is set explicitly. If the user removes the PKRU state from XSAVE in the signal handler then __fpu__restore_sig() will restore the missing bits from `init_fpstate' and initialize the PKRU value to 0. Add the `init_pkru_value' to `init_fpstate' so it is set to the init value in such a case. In theory copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs() could be removed because restoring the PKRU at return-to-userland should be enough. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403164156.19645-28-bigeasy@linutronix.de
		
			
				
	
	
		
			220 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			6.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			220 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			6.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
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|  * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
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|  *
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|  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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|  * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
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|  * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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|  *
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|  * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
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|  * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
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|  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for
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|  * more details.
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|  */
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| #include <linux/debugfs.h>		/* debugfs_create_u32()		*/
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| #include <linux/mm_types.h>             /* mm_struct, vma, etc...       */
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| #include <linux/pkeys.h>                /* PKEY_*                       */
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| #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
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| 
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| #include <asm/cpufeature.h>             /* boot_cpu_has, ...            */
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| #include <asm/mmu_context.h>            /* vma_pkey()                   */
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| #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>		/* init_fpstate			*/
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| 
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| int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
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| {
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| 	bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
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| 	int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
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| 	int ret;
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| 
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| 	/* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
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| 	if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
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| 		/* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
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| 		execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
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| 		if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
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| 			return -1;
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| 		need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
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| 	 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to.  Check it
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| 	 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
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| 	 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
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| 	 * ourselves.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
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| 	    !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
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| 		return execute_only_pkey;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
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| 	 * other than execution.
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| 	 */
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| 	ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
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| 			PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
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| 	/*
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| 	 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
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| 	 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (ret) {
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| 		mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
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| 		return -1;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
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| 	if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
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| 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
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| 	return execute_only_pkey;
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| }
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| 
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| static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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| {
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| 	/* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
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| 	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
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| 		return false;
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| 	if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
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| 		return false;
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| 
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| 	return true;
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
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|  */
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| int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
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| {
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call?  If so, never
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| 	 * override the value that came from the user.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (pkey != -1)
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| 		return pkey;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
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| 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
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| 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
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| 	 * support in this mm.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
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| 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
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| 		if (pkey > 0)
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| 			return pkey;
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| 	} else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
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| 		/*
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| 		 * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
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| 		 * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was
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| 		 * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to
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| 		 * the default pkey.
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| 		 */
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| 		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
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| 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
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| 	 * are working on.
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| 	 */
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| 	return vma_pkey(vma);
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| }
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| 
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| #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
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|  * as possible.  This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
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|  * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
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|  * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
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|  */
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| u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
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| 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
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| 		      PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
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| 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
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| 		      PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
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|  * registers.  This is called from a very specific context where
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|  * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
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|  * directly.
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|  */
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| void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
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| {
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| 	u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
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| 	 * with the baseline from the process.
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| 	 */
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| 	write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
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| }
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| 
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| static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
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| 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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| {
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| 	char buf[32];
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| 	unsigned int len;
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| 
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| 	len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
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| 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
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| }
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| 
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| static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
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| 		 const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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| {
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| 	struct pkru_state *pk;
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| 	char buf[32];
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| 	ssize_t len;
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| 	u32 new_init_pkru;
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| 
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| 	len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
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| 	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
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| 		return -EFAULT;
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| 
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| 	/* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
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| 	buf[len] = '\0';
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| 	if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
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| 		return -EINVAL;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
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| 	 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
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| 	 * or writes to pkey 0.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
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| 		return -EINVAL;
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| 
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| 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
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| 	pk = get_xsave_addr(&init_fpstate.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU);
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| 	if (!pk)
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| 		return -EINVAL;
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| 	pk->pkru = new_init_pkru;
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| 	return count;
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| }
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| 
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| static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
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| 	.read = init_pkru_read_file,
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| 	.write = init_pkru_write_file,
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| 	.llseek = default_llseek,
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| };
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| 
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| static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
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| {
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| 	debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
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| 			arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
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| 	return 0;
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| }
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| late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
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| 
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| static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
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| {
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| 	u32 new_init_pkru;
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| 
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| 	if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
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| 		return 1;
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| 
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| 	WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
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| 
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| 	return 1;
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| }
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| __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
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