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	 ae193dd793
			
		
	
	
		ae193dd793
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			Patch series "kasan: migrate the last module test to kunit", v4.
copy_user_test() is the last KUnit-incompatible test with
CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST requirement, which we are going to migrate to
KUnit framework and delete the former test and Kconfig as well.
In this patch series:
	- [1/3] move kasan_check_write() and check_object_size() to
		do_strncpy_from_user() to cover with KASAN checks with
		multiple conditions	in strncpy_from_user().
	- [2/3] migrated copy_user_test() to KUnit, where we can also test
		strncpy_from_user() due to [1/4].
		KUnits have been tested on:
		- x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC. Passed
		- arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS. 1 fail. See [1]
		- arm64 with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS. 1 fail. See [1]
		[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CACzwLxj21h7nCcS2-KA_q7ybe+5pxH0uCDwu64q_9pPsydneWQ@mail.gmail.com/
	- [3/3] delete CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST and documentation occurrences.
This patch (of 3):
Since in the commit 2865baf54077("x86: support user address masking
instead of non-speculative conditional") do_strncpy_from_user() is called
from multiple places, we should sanitize the kernel *dst memory and size
which were done in strncpy_from_user() previously.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241016131802.3115788-1-snovitoll@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241016131802.3115788-2-snovitoll@gmail.com
Fixes: 2865baf540 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hu Haowen <2023002089@link.tyut.edu.cn>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
		
	
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
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			156 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			4.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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| #include <linux/compiler.h>
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| #include <linux/export.h>
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| #include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
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| #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
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| #include <linux/thread_info.h>
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| #include <linux/uaccess.h>
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| #include <linux/kernel.h>
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| #include <linux/errno.h>
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| #include <linux/mm.h>
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| 
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| #include <asm/byteorder.h>
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| #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
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| 
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| #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
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| #define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst)	0
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| #else
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| #define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst)	\
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| 	(((long) dst | (long) src) & (sizeof(long) - 1))
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| #endif
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Do a strncpy, return length of string without final '\0'.
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|  * 'count' is the user-supplied count (return 'count' if we
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|  * hit it), 'max' is the address space maximum (and we return
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|  * -EFAULT if we hit it).
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|  */
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| static __always_inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
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| 					unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
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| {
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| 	const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
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| 	unsigned long res = 0;
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| 
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| 	if (IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst))
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| 		goto byte_at_a_time;
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| 
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| 	while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
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| 		unsigned long c, data, mask;
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| 
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| 		/* Fall back to byte-at-a-time if we get a page fault */
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| 		unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), byte_at_a_time);
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| 
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| 		/*
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| 		 * Note that we mask out the bytes following the NUL. This is
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| 		 * important to do because string oblivious code may read past
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| 		 * the NUL. For those routines, we don't want to give them
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| 		 * potentially random bytes after the NUL in `src`.
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| 		 *
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| 		 * One example of such code is BPF map keys. BPF treats map keys
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| 		 * as an opaque set of bytes. Without the post-NUL mask, any BPF
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| 		 * maps keyed by strings returned from strncpy_from_user() may
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| 		 * have multiple entries for semantically identical strings.
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| 		 */
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| 		if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
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| 			data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
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| 			data = create_zero_mask(data);
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| 			mask = zero_bytemask(data);
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| 			*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c & mask;
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| 			return res + find_zero(data);
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| 		}
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| 
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| 		*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c;
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| 
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| 		res += sizeof(unsigned long);
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| 		max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
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| 	}
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| 
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| byte_at_a_time:
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| 	while (max) {
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| 		char c;
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| 
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| 		unsafe_get_user(c,src+res, efault);
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| 		dst[res] = c;
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| 		if (!c)
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| 			return res;
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| 		res++;
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| 		max--;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
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| 	 * too? If so, that's ok - we got as much as the user asked for.
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| 	 */
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| 	if (res >= count)
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| 		return res;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
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| 	 * characters the caller would have wanted. That's an EFAULT.
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| 	 */
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| efault:
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| 	return -EFAULT;
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| }
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| 
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| /**
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|  * strncpy_from_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from userspace.
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|  * @dst:   Destination address, in kernel space.  This buffer must be at
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|  *         least @count bytes long.
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|  * @src:   Source address, in user space.
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|  * @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
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|  *
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|  * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to kernel space.
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|  *
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|  * On success, returns the length of the string (not including the trailing
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|  * NUL).
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|  *
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|  * If access to userspace fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been
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|  * copied).
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|  *
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|  * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count bytes
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|  * and returns @count.
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|  */
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| long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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| {
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| 	unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
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| 
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| 	might_fault();
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| 	if (should_fail_usercopy())
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| 		return -EFAULT;
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| 	if (unlikely(count <= 0))
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| 		return 0;
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| 
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| 	kasan_check_write(dst, count);
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| 	check_object_size(dst, count, false);
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| 
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| 	if (can_do_masked_user_access()) {
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| 		long retval;
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| 
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| 		src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
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| 		retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, count);
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| 		user_read_access_end();
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| 		return retval;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
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| 	src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(src);
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| 	if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
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| 		unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
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| 		long retval;
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| 
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| 		/*
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| 		 * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
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| 		 * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
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| 		 */
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| 		if (max > count)
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| 			max = count;
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| 
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| 		if (user_read_access_begin(src, max)) {
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| 			retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
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| 			user_read_access_end();
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| 			return retval;
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| 		}
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| 	}
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| 	return -EFAULT;
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);
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